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JUDICIAL REVIEW AS SOFT POWER:
HOW THE COURTS CAN HELP US 
WIN THE POST-9/11 CONFLICT
DAWINDER S. SIDHU*
The following is undisputed: on September 11, 2001, nineteen men hijacked four commercial 
planes, crashing them into the World Trade Center in New York, the Pentagon in Virginia, and a 
fi eld in rural Pennsylvania.1  Almost 3,000 innocents were killed in the process.2  “Americans will 
never forget the devastation wrought by these acts,” Justice John Paul Stevens observed.3  Al Qae-
da—a network of  Islamic radicals based in Afghanistan led by Osama bin Laden—claimed responsi-
bility.4
*  J.D., The George Washington University; M.A., Johns Hopkins University; B.A., University of  Pennsylvania.  Mr. 
Sidhu is an attorney whose primary intellectual focus is the relationship between individual rights and heightened 
national security concerns.  He is co-author of  CIVIL RIGHTS IN WARTIME: THE POST-9/11 SIKH EXPERIENCE (Ashgate).  
My thanks to the National Security Law Brief  staff  for improving the quality and readability of  this article; Amit Singh 
Aulakh for his research assistance; and my parents for their love.  I also extend my best wishes to this journal as it 
embarks on its efforts to enrich the legal community’s understanding of  pressing wartime issues.  I am honored to be 
part of  its inaugural issue.  The views expressed herein, and any errors, are mine alone.
1  See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 1-14 
(2004) [hereinafter 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT] 
2  See id. at 311 (noting that 2,973 fatalities occurred in the attacks, which were the largest loss of  life as a result of  a 
hostile attack in U.S. history) The attacks on the WTC killed 2,749 nonterrorists, including nonterrorist occupants of  the 
aircrafts.  The Pentagon attacks killed 184 victims, while forty nonterrorists died in United Flight 93.  Id. at 311 n.188.
3  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 568 (2006).
4  E.g., “Bin Laden Claims Responsibility for 9/11”, FOXNEWS.COM, Oct. 30, 2004, http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,137095,00.html (admitting and explaining why he ordered the September 11 attacks).
(chronicling the activities which occurred on each plane on September 11, 2001).
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In response, the nation went to war.  More specifi cally, the attacks triggered a military confl ict in 
which the United States pursued al Qaeda and its Taliban sponsors in Afghanistan.5  In short or-
der, the executive branch of  the United States approved military plans to quell these closely linked 
organizations, and U.S.-led coalition forces moved in the vicinity of  known al Qaeda strongholds in 
Afghanistan.6  On October 7, 2001, less than a month after 9/11, air strikes and raids began in these 
regions.7  
Meanwhile, the United States government speculated as to a nefarious relationship between al 
Qaeda and Saddam Hussein’s Iraqi regime.8  The United States, confi dent of  a suffi cient evidentiary 
nexus between the two, commenced its military campaign in Iraq on March 19, 2003.9
Fast forward to the present day.  In the nine-plus years since 9/11, the United States expended 
signifi cant resources and lost hundreds of  lives in both theatres of  war.  With respect to Afghani-
stan, the United States spends roughly $3.6 billion per month on the war effort,10 recently sent ap-
proximately 30,000 additional troops to the confl ict, increasing the grand total of  American soldiers 
there to 100,000,11 and has suffered over 1,000 casualties.12  With respect to Iraq, the United States 
5  See Authorization for the Use of  Military Force, Pub. L. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001) [hereinafter AUMF] 
(authorizing the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he 
determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” or “harbored such organizations or persons, 
in order to prevent any future acts of  international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organizations or 
persons); accord George W. Bush, 43rd President of  the United States, Address Before a Joint Session of  the Congress on 
the United States Response to the Terrorist Attacks of  September 11 (Sept. 20, 2001), available at http://www.dartmouth.
edu/~govdocs/docs/iraq/092001.pdf  (characterizing the attacks as an “act of  war” which would not end until “every 
terrorist group of  global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated). 
6  E.g., 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 337 (approving military plans to attack Afghanistan after meetings 
with key advisors).
7  Id. (planning Operation Enduring Freedom’s air strikes and Special Operations attacks, which initiated on October 
7).
8  Id. at 334 (exploring whether Saddam Hussein’s regime maintained any involvement with the September 11 attacks).  
“[Richard Clarke, an administration counter-terrorism offi cial] has written that on the evening of  September 12, 
President Bush told him and some of  his staff  to explore possible Iraqi links to 9/11.”  Id.
9  See George W. Bush, 43rd President of  the United States, Address to the Nation Regarding the Invasion of  Iraq 
(Mar. 19, 2003), available at http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030319-17.html 
(announcing the opening stages of  the war on Iraq). 
10  These are according to 2009 fi gures. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, LIBRARY OF CONGRESS, THE COST OF 
IRAQ, AFGHANISTAN, AND OTHER GLOBAL WAR ON TERROR OPERATIONS SINCE 9/11 22 (Sept. 28, 2009) [hereinafter CRS] 
(refl ecting a $500 million increase over the $3.1 billion monthly cost of  the Department of  Defense’s obligations in 
Fiscal Year 2008).
11  See Barack H. Obama, 44th President of  the United States, Remarks by the President in Address to the Nation on 
the Way Forward in Afghanistan and Pakistan (Dec. 1, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offi ce/
remarks-president-address-nation-way-forward-afghanistan-and-pakistan (increasing the U.S. troop deployment to 
Afghanistan by 30,000);  accord David E. Sanger & John F. Burns, Afghanistan Drawdown to Begin in 2011, Offi cials Say, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 1, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/02/world/asia/02policy.html?_r=1&pagewanted=all 
(calling for a short-term troop increase followed quickly by the beginning of  a withdrawal).
12  See iCasualties.org: Operation Enduring Freedom, ICASUALTIES.ORG, Mar. 26, 2010 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010), 
available at http://www.icasualties.org/OEF/ (enlarging the total number of  U.S. military deaths in Afghanistan to 1,029).
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spent $7.3 billion on the war in FY2009,13 had approximately 95,000 of  its troops in the area,14 and 
lost over 4,000 casualties.15
The United States’ post-9/11 military goals, particularly those in Afghanistan, are proving elu-
sive, despite these burgeoning commitments and these ultimate sacrifi ces.16  Admiral Mike Mullen, 
Chairman of  the Joint Chiefs of  Staff, described the condition in Afghanistan as “deteriorating,” 
adding that “[Afghanistan] is very vulnerable . . . [to the] Taliban and extremists taking over again, 
and I don’t think that threat’s going to go away.17  President Obama admitted that “the Taliban has 
gained momentum” and that al Qaeda elements “retain their safe-havens along the border” with 
Pakistan.18  As to Iraq, both the American and cooperating Iraqi contingents agree that Islamic ter-
rorists are regaining strength.19  To be sure, the American effort is not without progress.  Though 
certain milestones have been reached, including the toppling of  Hussein and institution of  voting 
democracies in both lands, the terrorists’ reach continues.  While the United States offi cially ended 
its part in Iraq combat operations bringing troops home was not a function of  the presence of  
institutional stability or domestic security, but was rather the product of  transfer of  responsibility for 
reaching these goals to the Iraqis themselves.20  In other words, stability and security remains a future 
13  CRS, supra note 11, at 20 (illustrating how the gradual reversal in the troop surge reduced the monthly cost of  the 
war from $11.1 billion in FY2008).
14  See Yochi J. Dreazen, U.S. Will Slow Iraq Pullout If  Violence Surges After Vote, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, Feb. 23, 2010, 
available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704454304575081642107227292.html (remarking that 
troop reduction was ahead of  schedule, as initial plans estimated that there would be 115,000 troops left in Iraq now).
15  See iCasualties.org: Operation Iraqi Freedom, ICASUALTIES.ORG, Mar. 26, 2010 (last visited Mar. 26, 2010), available at 
http://icasualties.org/Iraq/index.aspx/ (increasing the total number of  U.S. military deaths in Iraq to 4,386).
16  See THE WHITE HOUSE, WHITE PAPER OF THE INTERAGENCY POLICY GROUP’S REPORT ON U.S. POLICY TOWARDS 
AFGHANISTAN AND PAKISTAN 1 (Mar. 27, 2009) (defi ning American goals in Afghanistan to include disrupting terrorist 
networks in Afghanistan, promoting a more capable and effective government in Afghanistan that serves the Afghan 
people can eventually function, and developing increasingly self-reliant Afghan security forces that can lead the 
counterinsurgency and counterterrorism fi ght with reduced U.S. assistance); Barack H. Obama, 44th President of  the 
United States, Responsibly Ending the War in Iraq (Feb. 27, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
offi ce/remarks-president-barack-obama-ndash-responsibly-ending-war-iraq (promoting an Iraqi government that is 
representative, fair and accountable, and one that provides neither support or safe-haven to terrorists, building new ties 
of  trade and economy with the world, and creating a partnership with the government of  Iraq that contributes to the 
peace and security of  the region). 
17  CNN’s State of  the Union with John King (television broadcast Aug. 23, 2009) (transcript available at http://
transcripts.cnn.com/TRANSCRIPTS/0908/23/sotu.02.html) (indicating that the Taliban insurgency has increased their 
sophistication, effi ciency and danger of  their attacks).  
18  Barack H. Obama, supra note 11 (noting that the situation in Afghanistan has been moving backwards for several 
years).
19  See Ernesto Londoño, Al-Qaeda in Iraq Regaining Strength, WASH. POST, Nov. 22, 2009, at A16 (stating that al Qaeda 
has rebounded recently and is launching a coordinated effort to destroy the Iraqi Government).  General Ray Odierno, 
the top U.S. commander in Iraq, offered that al Qaeda remains “capable of  conducting singular high-profi le attacks.”  Id.
20  See Jim Michaels, Military begins last phase in Iraq Combat over, Odierno hands over command, USA TODAY, Sept. 2, 2010 
(with the pullout, Iraqi forces are “to assume responsibility for security.”) ; Mission Truncated, ECONOMIST, Sept. 2, 2010 
(the pullout simply was a fulfi llment of  President Obama’s “pledge” to “end of  our combat mission in Iraq” by August 
31, 2010). 
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prospect and must now be attained by the hands of  the Iraqis.21 
There can be little doubt that military victory overseas, at present, stands beyond the grasp of  
American’s long and powerful arm.22  Perhaps even more sobering is the fact that even if  the United 
States was faring better on the military front, such success would be insuffi cient to prevail in the war. 
As the 9/11 Commission noted, al Qaeda “represents an ideological movement, not a fi nite group 
of  people,” akin to a “decentralized force.”23
The American strategy, however, appears to be one based on warfare.  Judge Richard A. Posner 
observed that “we have no strategy for defeating them, only fi ghting them.”24  President Obama’s 
foreign policy objectives in the war have been considered to be “exclusively military” and, on that 
score, the war “is not going well.”25  Put differently, the American efforts appear to be limited in 
scope and disappointing in that narrow subset of  possible action against transnational terrorism. 
These facts are beyond dispute—in committing the terrorist atrocities on 9/11, al Qaeda pro-
voked the United States into a war in Afghanistan that was expanded to Iraq.  These confl icts are be-
ing waged primarily on the military arena, and the achievement of  American goals in both arenas has 
been frustrated despite years of  effort, billions of  dollars, and the lives of  many American soldiers.  
What can we do differently?  What other instruments are available to the United States such that 
defeating—not just capably fi ghting—the terrorists may be a closer prospect?  Specifi cally, how can 
American law be an advantage to our national security? 
This Article seeks to answer these questions.  In this Article, I will argue that the American re-
sponse to Islamic terrorist factions must move outside the military sphere in which battles are fought 
between arms and men to a more conceptual contest for hearts and minds, where the ammunition 
in this abstract war will be fundamental American principles, particularly a constitutional commit-
ment to the rule of  law, and where advancements in the war will be based on incrementally increased 
attraction to America.  This approach will speak to one’s will and conscience in an effort to secure a 
more lasting respite from the ongoing struggles that have no foreseeable end in sight, have been at-
21  See Michael Christie, U.S. ends combat in Iraq but instability lingers,  REUTERS, Aug. 30, 2010 (“The U.S. military formally 
ends combat operations in Iraq on Tuesday as President Barack Obama seeks to fulfi ll a promise to end the war despite 
persistent instability and attacks that kill dozens at a time.”).
22  See, e.g., A.J. Rossmiller, Stalemate: Why A Real Counter-insurgency Strategy Is Not Possible in Afghanistan—And Why Politics 
May Be the Answer; THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct 13, 2009, http://www.tnr.com/article/world/stalemate (asserting that fi rst, 
the insurgency lacks the capability to depose the central government or defeat U.S. forces; and, second, U.S. forces do 
not have the ability to vanquish the insurgency). 
23  See 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 16 (explaining that the capture or death of  bin Laden would do little 
to stem the creation of  a new generation of  terrorists).
24  RICHARD A. POSNER, NOT A SUICIDE PACT: THE CONSTITUTION IN A TIME OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY 5 (2006) (arguing 
that the success of  the 9/11 attacks did more to turn the Muslim world against the West than the vigorous military 
response to al Qaeda has done to weaken the terrorist movement).
25  Fareed Zakaria, Obama, the Anti-Churchill?, WASH. POST, Dec. 7, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/
wp-dyn/content/article/2009/12/06/AR2009120602381.html (describing Obama’s efforts as a focus on reorienting 
U.S. foreign policy, narrowing the “war on terrorism,” increasing bipartisan relationships with key allies and scaling back 
the confl ict with the Islamic world and the Middle East).
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tended by suffering and sorrow, and have claimed a growing number of  victims on all sides.26  
 Part I will distinguish between “hard power,” which generally constitutes the ability to attain 
favorable foreign policy outcomes by way of  military force or economic coercion, and “soft power,” 
defi ned as the ability to achieve those outcomes by way of  attraction.27  Though soft power gener-
ally is thought to include a nation’s values, social norms, and culture, academic studies have not fully 
demonstrated that a nation’s legal dimensions—specifi cally its legal institutions and adherence to the 
rule of  law—are also a form of  soft power.28  This part will attempt to make this showing, citing to 
aspects of  the American constitutional design that may be attractive to people of  other communi-
ties, including Muslims.29
The legal principles established by the Framers and enshrined in the Constitution are a source 
of  attraction only if  we have meaningfully adhered to them in practice.  Part II will posit that the 
Supreme Court’s robust evaluation of  cases in the wartime context suggests that the nation has been 
faithful to the rule of  law even in times of  national stress.  As support, this part will provide exam-
ples of  cases involving challenges to the American response to wars both before and after 9/11, the 
discussion of  which will exhibit American respect for the rule of  law.  While the substantive results 
of  some of  these cases may be particularly pleasing to Muslims, for instance the extension of  habeas 
protections to detainees in Guantánamo,30 this part will make clear that it is the legal process—not 
substantive victories for one side or against the government—which is the true source of  American 
legal soft power.
If  it is the case that the law may be an element of  soft power conceptually and that the use of  
the legal process has refl ected this principle in practice, the conclusion argues that it would benefi t 
American national security for others in the world to be made aware of  the American constitutional 
framework and the judiciary’s activities related to the war.  Such information would make it more 
likely that other nations and peoples, especially moderate Muslims, will be attracted to American 
interests.
26  See LINDSEY J. BORG, PROGRAM ON INFORMATION RESOURCES POLICY, COMMUNICATING WITH INTENT: THE 
DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION vii (Feb. 2008), available at: http://pirp.harvard.edu/pubs_pdf/
borg/borg-i08-1.pdf  (arguing that the “[u]se of  a nation’s hard power  [i.e. military force or economic coercion] is 
inadequate as the sole—or even primary — means to address an insurgency”).
27  See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., BOUND TO LEAD: THE CHANGING NATURE OF AMERICAN POWER 32, 188 (1990) [hereinafter 
BOUND TO LEAD] (fi nding that modern trends and changes in political issues are having signifi cant effects on the nature 
of  power and the resources that produce it).
28  See infra Part I.B (examining different aspects of  the American legal system that may appeal to the Muslim world).
29  See Donald J. Kochan, The Soft Power and Persuasion of  Translations in the War on Terror: Words and Wisdom in the 
Transformation of  Legal Systems, 110 W. VA. L. REV. 545, 557 (2008) (suggesting that translating the “documents we rely on 
in the United States for the foundation of  our own laws” into Arabic publications may allows us to connect with others 
and alter their behavior).  Kochan, however, does not focus on judicial behavior as a form of  soft power, draw out 
specifi c elements of  American constitutional law that may be particularly attractive in theory, or provide examples, either 
post-9/11 or otherwise, of  how we have lived up to the legal principles in actuality.  Id.
30  See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2275–76 (2008) (entitling the constitutionally guaranteed right of  habeas 
corpus review applies to persons held in Guantanamo and to persons designated as enemy combatants).
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This Article thus reaches a conclusion that may seem counterintuitive—that the judicial branch, 
in the performance of  its constitutional duty of  judicial review, furthers American national secu-
rity and foreign policy objectives even when it may happen to strike down executive or legislative 
arguments for expanded war powers to prosecute the current war on terror and even though the 
executive and legislature constitute the foreign policy branches of  the federal government.  In other 
words, a “loss” for the executive or legislature, may be considered, in truth, a reaffi rmation of  our 
constitutional system and therefore a victory for the entire nation in the neglected but necessary 
post-9/11 war of  ideas.31  As such, it is the central contention of  this Article that the judicial branch 
is a repository of  American soft power and thus a useful tool in the post-9/11 confl ict.
Before proceeding, it is important to note what this Article will not do.  First, while I will dis-
cuss Supreme Court cases as indicating the continued vitality of  judicial review in wartime, I will not 
assess the relative merits of  the cases themselves, again as it is the legal process and not the specifi c 
results that is important for purposes of  this Article.  Whether the Supreme Court should have 
come out another way in a given case will require a comprehensive analysis best suited for a separate 
forum.  Second, this Article does not intend to downplay or second-guess the military efforts un-
dertaken by the United States thus far, including the decision to go in to Iraq.32  This Article argues 
that a military component, however managed, is part and parcel of  the American response to the 
9/11 attacks.  It aims only to supplement these military efforts by adding a more sophisticated and 
meaningful tactic to the overall arsenal available to the United States.  Third, this Article does not 
deny that the political landscape in the United States has changed in that the Obama administration 
is apparently more receptive to the use of  diplomacy as a piece of  its foreign policy apparatus.33  But 
it does not appear that the administration has actually propagated this idea into reality.34 
That said, this Article offers more than a theory or idea, but a proposal about how the United 
States may fulfi ll its national security needs in an unconventional war of  indefi nite nature.  Any sug-
gestions as to how progress can be achieved such that the war may be brought to an end should be 
31  See JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., SOFT POWER: THE MEANS TO SUCCESS IN WORLD POLITICS 25 (2004) [hereinafter SOFT 
POWER] (“the means the Bush administration chose . . . did not take enough account of  soft power.”).  But see Jaime 
Holguin, Soft Power and Hard Power: CBS’ Charles Wolfson Examines Powell’s Remarks In Davos, CBSNEWS.COM, Jan. 28, 2003, 
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/01/28/opinion/diplomatic/main538320.shtml (quoting then-Bush 
administration offi cial Colin Powell as stating, “There comes a time when soft power or talking with evil will not work, 
where, unfortunately, hard power is the only thing that works”).
32  See Kochan, supra note 29, at 557 (championing an argument for simultaneous mix of  hard and soft foreign policy 
rather than advocating against the use of  hard power.).  “[Soft power] is . . . a  necessary complement to the  hard  power 
of  conventional war.”  Id. at 569.
33  See Unjust, Unwise, UnAmerican:  Why Terrorist Tribunals Are Wrong, THE ECONOMIST, July 12, 2003, at 9 (arguing 
that the Bush Administration’s failure to use civilian courts to try enemy combatants “[blunted] one of  America’s most 
powerful weapons against terrorism).  But cf. David E. Sanger, Obama’s Advisers to Back Soft Power, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 1, 
2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/01/world/americas/01iht-obama.4.18305735.html (fi nding that the 
Obama administration has signaled some interest in incorporating soft power into its foreign policy regime). 
34  See, e.g., Barack H. Obama, 44th President of  the United States, Remarks by the President at the Acceptance of  
the Nobel Peace Prize, (Dec. 10, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-offi ce/remarks-president-
acceptance-nobel-peace-prize (justifying the use of  military force [“hard power”] against terrorists, but failing to consider 
the effect that non-violent means [“soft power”] may have in attaining the same result).
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entertained, particularly when it is clear that current and discarded strategies have not been entirely 
successful.  A failure to enrich the universe of  national security programs and policies, given the per-
sistent elusiveness of  victory, may be tantamount to a willful extension of  a multi-theatre campaign 
necessarily entailing further death and destruction.  
The very safety—typifi ed as freedom from further acts of  terrorism on U.S. soil that resemble or 
may dwarf  9/11—of  the American people not only hangs in the balance, but is dependent upon our 
collective ability to embrace strategies that will strengthen our national security by softening the will 
of  our adversaries.  
What follows is one such proposed strategy, predicated on our belief  in and adherence to the 
rule of  law. 
I.  SOFT POWER
A. Soft Power Defi ned
The world is comprised of  different peoples, located in various regions, having their own par-
ticular languages, cultures, and norms.  Some have found it necessary or convenient to constitute 
themselves into sovereign entities in order to more effectively ensure the welfare and safety of  its 
members, advance collective interests, and regulate certain behavior among the inhabitants, among 
other things.35  
A necessary byproduct of  this is the inclination and potential for one sovereign to interact with 
and infl uence others.36  John Jay, for example, noted that monarchs are apt to dominate neighbor-
ing lands for no “just” reason, but to further their selfi sh, personal ambitions.37  By contrast, Jay’s 
more idealistic contemporaries, Thomas Jefferson and James Madison, contemplated a world in 
which foreign relations would be based on mutual interest as expressed in commerce—such fi nan-
cial pushes and pulls would replace aggression and confl ict as the appropriate arena of  international 
intercourse.38
Joseph S. Nye—a former government offi cial who served in the State, National Security, and 
Defense agencies, and current professor of  government and international affairs at Harvard Univer-
sity—made a signifi cant contribution to American political theory by recognizing that foreign infl u-
ence is not monolithic,39 suggesting specifi cally that foreign infl uence spans a spectrum of  certain 
 
36  See THE FEDERALIST NOS. 2-4 (John Jay), supra note 35, at 5–15 (implying that a united federal government was best 
suited to resist and handle such infl uences, that nations impact each other, and that the U.S. was not immune from this 
reality of  a heterogeneous globe).
37   THE FEDERALIST NO. 4 (John Jay), supra note 35 (demonstrating that monarchs often wage war for personal 
reasons, revenge, private ambition or economic enrichment, rather than for the benefi t of  their nation).
38  See GORDON S. WOOD, REVOLUTIONARY CHARACTERS:  WHAT MADE THE FOUNDERS DIFFERENT 168 (2006) 
(envisioning a world composed of  states whose governments were identical with the will of  the people, existing in an 
environment held together by commerce); see also Letter from Thomas Jefferson, to Meriwether Lewis (Aug. 21, 1808), in 
A JEFFERSON PROFILE: AS REVEALED IN HIS LETTERS 173 (Saul K. Padover ed., 1956) (noting that Jefferson “advocate[ed] 
commerce as ‘the  great  engine’ with which to ‘coerce [others]’ into more compliant posture”).
39  See SOFT POWER, supra note 31, at 6 (reminding the reader that while “infl uence” may be based on soft power, it 
“can also rest on the hard power of  threats and payments”).
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identifi able resources available to nations and peoples.40  
On one end is “hard power,” which “is usually associated with tangible resources like military 
and economic strength.”41  Coercion is the essence of  hard power, a foreign policy characterized 
by way of  the carrot (inducements) and the stick (threats).42  “Money and guns” are “the traditional 
high cards of  hard state power,”43 though hard power resources include not only “armed forces” and 
“economic sanctions,” but also “oil and gas reserves,” and “industrial assets that can be mobilized in 
an emergency.”44
On the other is “soft power,” which generally consists of  a nation’s ability to get what it wants 
“through attraction rather than coercion or payments.”45  It tends to be associated with intangible 
power resources such as an appealing culture, ideology, or institutions.46  For example, “democracy,” 
“listening to others,” “promoting peace and human rights,” are all aspects of  soft power.47  Whereas 
hard power is direct, soft power is indirect; whereas hard power generally is unilateral, soft power is 
less so.48 
The spectrum analogy may lead to the impression that hard and soft power resources are sepa-
rate instruments of  foreign infl uence that operate wholly independent of  one another.  According 
to Nye, they do not operate in isolation—they are interrelated.  For example, despite the signifi -
cant amount of  soft power resources the United States amassed immediately after the tragedies of  
9/11, the U.S.’s “stunning” demonstration of  hard power in the war on Iraq “was costly for our soft 
power,” Nye states.49  More to the point, he posits that “our neglect of  allies and institutions has 
created a sense of  illegitimacy that has squandered our attractiveness,”50 and the U.S.’s “overbearing, 
40 See id. at 7 (characterizing hard and soft power on a related spectrum, as they are both tools to effectuate a result by 
affecting others’ behaviors); BOUND TO LEAD, supra note 27, at 267 n.11 (describing the distinction between hard power 
and soft power as one of  “degree, both in the nature of  behavior and the tangibility of  the resources”).
41  BOUND TO LEAD, supra note 27, at 32 (identifying command power, or the ability to change what others do, with 
hard power).
42  JOSEPH S. NYE, JR., THE PARADOX OF AMERICAN POWER: WHY THE WORLD’S ONLY SUPERPOWER CAN’T GO IT ALONE 8 
(2002) [hereinafter PARADOX] (giving military power and economic coercion as examples of  hard power that can induce 
others to change their viewpoint).
43 Id. at 11 (detailing other means like war, coercive diplomacy, economic sanctions and bribes).
44  Id. at 8, 11 (determining that although some of  these means are strictly governmental or inherently national, many 
can be transferred to collective control).
45  SOFT POWER, supra note 31, at x (arising from the appeal of  a country’s “cultural and political ideals”). 
46  PARADOX, supra note 43, at 11 (illustrating soft power as including its behavior at home, in international institutions, 
in foreign policy and its cultural behavior).
47  Id. at 11 (expressing that soft power does not belong to the government in the same degree as hard power does).
48  See BOUND TO LEAD, supra note 27, at 33 (fi nding that soft power is becoming more important in world politics 
today than hard power).
49  SOFT POWER, supra note 31, at xii (refl ecting the idea that creating peace is harder than winning a war, and soft 
power is essential to creating peace).
50  Id. at 147 (identifying the conscious U.S. choice to focus its efforts primarily in the domain of  hard power, where it 
has invested more, trained more and succeeded more).
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unilateral” use of  hard power “undermines its soft power.”51  Quite simply, the way in which Ameri-
ca used its hard power affected, that is to say drained, its soft power. 
Nye argues that hard and soft power are not only related, but are both necessary to achieve 
desirable international outcomes—in other words, sound foreign policy requires a healthy blend of  
both hard and soft power.  While hard power “will play a role in defeating terrorists,”52  by itself  it is 
an inadequate to contend with foreign policy matters, particularly transnational terrorism.53  Similarly, 
soft power is “crucial” to American foreign policy,54 but cannot succeed by itself.  Rather, “[b]oth 
hard and soft power will be necessary for successful foreign policy in a global information age.”55  
That American foreign engagement must stand on two legs is not a theoretical fi ction, but a verifi -
able reality exemplifi ed by the American wartime conduct.  In the aftermath of  the 9/11 attacks, the 
United States has relied too heavily on hard power, thereby neglecting soft power.56  Over nine years 
after 9/11, it is evident by the continuing threats to American security domestically and abroad that 
American dependence on hard power “did not resolve our vulnerability to terrorism.”57
Therefore to win the peace—not just win the war—America will need to use soft power as 
well.58  For example, soft power was imperative to American success in the Cold War.  This idea is 
demonstrated quite favorably by a commentator who said, “However important the military power 
and political promise of  the United States were . . . it was the American economic and cultural at-
traction that really won over the hearts and minds of  the majorities of  young people for Western 
democracy.”59
Indeed, soft power will not only complement and steady American foreign policy, but may be a 
more compelling and dependable conduit for positive foreign policy results.  In the Internet era es-
51  PARADOX, supra note 43, at 39 (specifying that those who recommend a largely hegemonic “hard power” response 
to foreign policy are relying on woefully inadequate analysis that further harms the U.S.’ ability to be successful in the 
foreign arena).  It is beyond the purposes of  this article to verify or challenge Nye’s assessment of  the American post-
9/11 use of  hard power is correct.  It is important to note only the more limited principle that there is a relationship 
between hard and soft power.
52  Id. at 7 (writing that ignoring the role of  force and the centrality of  security would be catastrophic to maintaining 
peace).
53  See SOFT POWER, supra note 31, at 15 (contending that the sole use of  command and control strategies ignores 
the use of  structural power, which achieves outcomes without making actors change their behavior without threats or 
payments).
54  PARADOX, supra note 43, at 39 (noting that soft power resources, primarily the openness of  American society, easily 
penetrate state actors while enhancing U.S. credibility and attractiveness to the rest of  the world).
55  Id (observing that a mix of  hard and soft power will be necessary to succeed in the next century). 
56  SOFT POWER, supra note 31, at 7 (writing that “the U.S. government spends four hundred times more on hard power 
than on soft power.”).
57  Id. at 119 (regarding the military removal Saddam Hussein and his Iraqi regime as only the fi rst step in a long-term 
transformation of  the country that will require economic and political change to keep the country peaceful and free).
58  Id. at xii (explaining that getting “others to buy in to your values” is the key foundational step necessary to use soft 
power effectively).
59  Id. at 50  (illustrating that hard power created the stand-off  of  military containment, but that soft power eroded the 
Soviet system from within).
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pecially, “soft power may prove the more effective sell.”60  This is because “seduction is always more 
effective than coercion, and many values like democracy, human rights, and individual opportunities 
are deeply seductive.”61  
In short, the theory of  soft power dictates that, for America to prevail in its campaign against 
transnational terrorism, soft power—the ability to attract others—must become a conspicuous com-
ponent of  its foreign policy activities. 
B. American Legal Institutions as a Form of  Soft Power Generally
For soft power to move from the shadows to a place of  prominence in American foreign policy 
with respect to the national struggle against terrorists, America must fi rst determine what soft power 
resources are available to it.  The universe of  American soft power resources is indeed extensive and 
includes, for example, American popular culture, democracy, support of  human rights, and its civic 
institutions.62  
This Article is concerned with the law as an aspect of  American soft power.  Nye, in almost 
passing fashion, indicates that the law is subsumed under the banner of  soft power.63  But he does 
not explicitly fl esh out the precise features of  the law in America that may attract others to our inter-
ests.  The question therefore arises, what is it about law in America that may serve as soft power? 
Before attempting an answer, it is important to identify the audience of  any soft power volley in 
the post-9/11 context.  As Nye acknowledges, a prerequisite for the use of  soft power is the exis-
tence of  “willing receivers” of  a nation’s particular message.64  The core fundamentalists absorbed 
by their warped take on Islam may be beyond reason and thus may not be receptive to a message 
on the intangible virtues of  the American state.  The moderate elements in Afghanistan, Iraq, and 
neighboring regions, however, may be amenable to persuasion and, if  convinced, may be effective 
agents of  the American narrative by subsequently and more meaningfully conveying it to the ex-
tremists.  With the hardcore fundamentalists presumptively out of  the reach of  reasonable argument 
or enticement, “the ability to attract the moderates is critical to victory.65  Therefore, legal soft power 
must address and convince these moderates.  
With the “who” out of  the way, the “what” question remains. The rest of  this section will 
60  Id. at 107 (commenting that the information age and its ability to broadcast news and information from multiple 
sources have changed the effi cacy of  soft power).
61  Id. at x (arguing that soft power can advance U.S. infl uence further beyond the edge of  traditional hard power 
tactics).
62  PARADOX, supra note 43, at 11 (expressing the value of  democracy, personal freedom, upward mobility and 
openness through these resources).
63  See, e.g., SOFT POWER, supra note 31, at 12, 15, 119 (mentioning, without signifi cant discussion, how foreign public 
opinion identifi es the American rule of  law with soft power resources). 
64  Id. at 120 (suggesting that cultural barriers are far from insurmountable, as soft power has proven effective in 
both Europe, a willing receiver, and Japan and South Korea, two countries that had great cultural differences between 
themselves and the U.S.).
65  Id. at 131 (predicting victory only if  the U.S. adopts policies that appeal to moderates and more effectively explains 
our common interests rather than identifi es our differences).
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identify six fundamental themes in the American constitutional system which may resonate with the 
moderates in the Muslim world.  
The Role of  The People
The constituent members of  a political community, the people, are generally and increasingly 
marginalized in the traditionally “autocratic” and “repressive” governmental systems of  the Arab 
world.66  By contrast, the people are the sole source of  political authority in the United States and 
exhibit the ability to check the actions of  their political representatives.67  The government in the 
United States is a “limited agency of  the people—lent out to the various government offi cials . . . on 
a short-term, always recallable loan.”68  The power of  the government is temporary and subject to 
the consent of  the governed, with all non-delegated power reserved to the people.69  Moreover, the 
Constitution operates as the governing document of  the United States only because it was ratifi ed by 
the people70 and the federal government has “no power not derived from the Constitution.”71  The 
fact that power rests with the people, and that the government holds limited and temporary respon-
sibilities in trust for the people, may be of  signifi cant attraction to those with theoretically and/or 
practically less political control over the direction or welfare of  their lives. 
Separation of  Powers
At “the heart” of  the Constitution is the allocation of  federal power into three separate, coor-
dinate branches.72  The government of  the United States is diffused so as to frustrate the ability of  
the people to be oppressed by its colluding leaders.73  Put differently, “[t]he ultimate purpose of  this 
66  Cf. Sharon Otterman, Middle East: Islam and Democracy, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, Sept. 19, 2003, available 
at http://www.cfr.org/publication/7708/#p3 (citing a Freedom House study that over “’the last 30 years ha[s] seen a 
trend diametrically opposite to the global trend toward political liberalization’ in Muslim nations’”).  This is particularly 
true for nations in the Arab world, many of  which have taken steps backward in terms of  political liberties and electoral 
democracy in the last 10 years.”  Id.
 
67  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, at 228 (Alexander Hamilton) (Roy P. Fairfi eld ed., 1989) (stating that an affi rmation 
of  a legislative act enacted contrary to the Constitution “would be to affi rm, that the deputy is greater than his principal; 
that the servant is above his master; that the representatives of  the people are superior to the people themselves; that 
men acting by virtue of  powers, may do not only what their powers do not authorize, but what they forbid.”).
68  WOOD, supra note 38, at 192 (Penguin Press 2006) (differentiating the U.S. system of  governance from monarchies, 
aristocratic senates and popular democracy).
69  U.S. CONST. amend. X.
70  See, e.g., Letter from James Madison to Henry Lee (Jun. 25, 1824), THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON, 1819–1836, at 
191 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1910) (“I entirely concur in the propriety of  resorting to the sense in which the Constitution was 
accepted and ratifi ed by the nation.  In that  sense  alone  it  is the  legitimate  Constitution.”).
71  Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 25 (1942).
72  See INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983).
73  See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 140 (James Madison) (Roy Fairfi eld ed., 1961) (saying that where the same 
body controls the whole power of  more than one department, the fundamental principles of  a free constitution are 
subverted).
80 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEF Vol. 1, No. 1
separation of  powers is to protect the liberty and security of  the governed.”74  The very design of  
the government stems from the Framers’ own experience with an overreaching monarch and their 
attendant concern that a similarly powerful government could infringe upon the rights of  the peo-
ple.75  Those in the Muslim world may be inclined to think of  the United States as an unrestrained 
occupying force without regard for those subject to its hegemonic aspirations.76  But these individu-
als may be contented in the knowledge that the United States government from its origins is set up 
to safeguard and maximize the liberty of  the everyday citizen, not to embolden or create an imperial 
republic.
Substantive Rights
In addition to the structure of  the American government, which aims to ensure that the people 
are free of  oppression, the Constitution contains substantive guarantees that explicitly protect the 
life, liberty, and property of  the people.77  As some Muslims may be of  the view that the target of  
the current confl icts in Iraq and Afghanistan is Islam (rather than terrorism),78 the right that may be 
of  greatest interest to moderate Muslims is the freedom of  religion mandated by the First Amend-
ment.79  The freedom of  an individual to practice his or her faith according to the dictates of  con-
science alone, and free of  government interference, is a core American right.80  As with the concept 
of  the separation of  powers, religious liberty enjoys a special place in American society precisely be-
74  Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for Abatement of  Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991).
75  See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229, 2246 (2008) (describing the Framers’ “inherent distrust of  governmental 
power” as the primary force behind the separation of  powers).
76  See, e.g., MICHAEL SCHEUER, IMPERIAL HUBRIS:  WHY THE WEST IS LOSING THE WAR ON TERROR 213 (2004) (suggesting 
that before 2003, it was only a far-fetched dream for Bin Laden that “Muslims would see  each day on television that the 
 United  States was  occupying a  Muslim country, insisting that made-man [sic] laws replace God’s revealed word, stealing 
Iraqi oil, and paving the way for the creation of  a ‘Greater Israel.’”).
77  See e.g. U.S. CONST. amend. I (freedom of  religion, speech, press and assembly); U.S. CONST. amend. IV  (freedom 
from unreasonable searches and seizures); U.S. CONST. amend. V (due process, double jeopardy, self-incrimination, 
eminent domain); U.S. CONST. amend. VI (trial by jury and rights of  the accused, Confrontation Clause, speedy trial, 
public trial, right to counsel); U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (prohibition of  excessive bail and cruel and unusual punishment).
78  It is this belief  that seems to have contributed to the Fort Hood shooting in which a Muslim, Major Nidal Malik 
Hasan, an Army psychiatrist, indiscriminately killed fellow soldiers about to deploy for a tour of  duty overseas.  See 
Justin Blum, Hasan Called War on Terror an Attack on Islam, Classmate Says, BLOOMBERG.COM, Nov. 7, 2009, http://www.
bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a0OrWS8lBtNg (reporting that classmates of  Hasan claimed that he 
called the U.S. war on terror “a war against Islam”, and that he “was always concerned that Muslims in the military were 
being persecuted.”).
79  See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law . . . prohibiting the free exercise of  [religion.]”)
80  See School Dist. of  Abington v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 226 (1963) (recognizing that religion’s role in society is an 
“exalted one”, and that it is not within the government’s power to invade this arena); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 93 n.127 
(1976) (“[R]eligious  worship  both in  method and  belief  must be  strictly  protected from  government  intervention.”).
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cause of  the Framers’ unfavorable experience with religious intolerance,81 which may strike a special 
chord with some Muslims who have endured injustice or who perceive hostility due to their holding 
of  particular religious beliefs.82
Value of  Diverse Views
Similarly, that people with different interests and passions, including religious ideologies, would 
be part of  the United States was a factual reality not only contemplated but embraced by the Fram-
ers.  In Federalist No. 10, one of  the bedrock statements of  American political theory,83 James 
Madison argued that a nation of  increasingly heterogeneous people would make it less likely that any 
one such group, or “faction,” would be able to dominate or oppress the rest.84  Diversity of  interests 
to the Framers was not simply a matter of  tolerance, but was seen as a pragmatic advantage of  the 
extended American republic.85  Accordingly, the United States, from the outset and at least in prin-
ciple, can be considered an earnest bastion for diverse peoples, including the religious.86 
Judicial Review
The courts are a vehicle through which the people may seek to stop and seek redress for in-
fringements on individual rights, including religious freedom.87  “The evidence is overwhelming,” 
scholar Michael W. McConnell notes, that the “framers and ratifi ers understood and intended the 
81  See Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 703 (1986) (remarking that “historical instances of   religious  persecution and 
intolerance . . . gave concern to those who drafted the Free Exercise Clause . . . .”); Douglas v. Jeannette, 319 U.S. 157, 179 
(1943) (Jackson, J., concurring in result) (explaining that “the First Amendment separately mention[s] free exercise of  
religion” due to “[t]he history of  religious persecution . . . .”).
82  The religious strife amongst Muslims and those in the Muslim world are perhaps best exemplifi ed by the historic 
situation in Iraq.  See Michael J. Frank, Justice for Iraq, Justice for All, 57 OKLA. L. REV. 303, 308 (2004) (recounting some 
of  the atrocities committed by the Sunni-majority in Iraq as including “ oppression of  the  Shiites, genocide against the 
Kurds, torture and systematic rape of  the citizenry, [and] testing biological weapons on prisoners of  war . . . .”).  Such 
religious-based conduct is not limited to Iraq.  E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REPORT 
2009, available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2009/index.htm) (recording the status of  respect for religious 
freedom in all countries during the period from July 1, 2008 to June 30, 2009).
83  See Frank H. Easterbrook, Abstraction and Authority, 59 U. CHI. L. REV. 349, 378 (1992) (calling Federalist No. 10 
“perhaps the greatest document of   political  theory penned on this side of  the Atlantic”); see also WOOD, supra note 38, at 
161 (“Federalist No. 10 has become the most famous document in the history of  American political thought.”).
84  See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison), supra note 73, at 22–23 (arguing that larger the variety of  parties and 
interests, the less likely a majority of  the whole will have the ability to invade the rights of  other citizens).
85  See id. (fi nding this diversity of  interests to be a “republican remedy” for the affl ictions affecting most democratic 
governments).
86  As an example of  such religious inclusion, Thomas Jefferson stated, “I write with freedom because, while I claim 
a right to believe in one God, I yield as freely to others that of  believing in three.”  Jon Meacham, AMERICAN GOSPEL:  
GOD, THE FOUNDING FATHERS, AND THE MAKING OF A NATION 75 (2006).
87  See 1 Annals of  Cong. 457 (J. Gales ed. 1790) (noting that Madison believed that independent tribunals would be the 
guardian of  the rights guaranteed by the Bill of  Rights, acting as an impenetrable wall against every assumption of  power 
by the legislative or the executive) .
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courts to engage in constitutional judicial review” of  actions that may be thought to contravene 
the solemn boundaries of  the separation of  powers or the substantive mandates of  the American 
governing documents.88  This is particularly so when the religious rights of  the people are implicated 
by such challenged governmental or private action.89  As Justice Sandra Day O’Connor wrote, “Our 
Founders conceived of  a Republic receptive to voluntary religious expression, and provided for the 
possibility of  judicial intervention when government action threatens or impedes such expression.”  
The judiciary engages in and completes its review of  cases independently, that is “on the basis of  
law and facts, not extraneous matters,” such as infl uence from other organs of  the government or 
pressure from the people.90
The “Great Wall”
The writ of  habeas corpus enables an individual to challenge the factual basis and legality of  his 
detention,91 activating the judiciary’s review function in the separation of  powers scheme.92  Because 
the writ acts to secure individual liberty by way of  the judicial checking of  unlawful executive de-
tentions, the writ has been regarded as a bulwark of  liberty. The Supreme Court has observed, for 
example, that “There is no higher duty of  a court, under our constitutional system, than the careful 
processing and adjudication  of  petitions for writs of  habeas corpus . . . .”93 The writ is seen as a vital 
aspect of  American jurisprudence, and an essential element of  the law since the time of  the Fram-
ers.94 
88  Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of  Free Exercise of  Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 
1445 n.186 (1990) (viewing the judiciary as the empowerment of  the individual against the power of  the state and 
wanting to secure its independence to achieve that end).
89  See McCreary County, Ky. v. ACLU of  Ky., 545 U.S. 844, 883 (2005) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
90  A Conversation About Judicial Independence and Impartiality, 89 JUDICATURE 339, 341 (2006) (statement of  Shirley 
Abrahamson, Wis. C.J.); see id. at 339 (statement of  Sandra  Day O’Connor, J.) (asserting that “an independent judiciary 
is an impenetrable bulwark against every assumption of  power in the legislative or executive . . . . [I]f  you believe, as 
Madison and I do, that the courts are important guardians of  constitutionally guaranteed freedoms in our common law 
system, you know the system breaks down without judicial independence.”).
91  See Harris v. Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 290–91 (1969) (calling the writ “the fundamental instrument for safeguarding 
individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action.”).
92  The writ of  habeas corpus has served as a means of  reviewing the legality of  Executive detention and it is in that 
context that its protections have been strongest.  INS v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 301 (2001).  See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr. 
& Daniel J. Meltzer, Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction, Substantive Rights, and the War on Terror, 120 HARV. L. REV. 2029, 2032 (2007) 
(arguing that the habeas corpus is a mechanism which requires that no other branch of  government illegally detain an 
individual, even during wartime).   
93  Harris, 394 U.S. at 292.
94  The language of  Congress, the history of  the writ, the decisions of  this Court, all make clear that the power of  
inquiry on federal habeas corpus is plenary.  Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 312 (1963), overruled by Keeney v. Tamayo-Reyes, 
504 U.S. 1, 5 (1992), superceded by statute, Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of  1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, 
110 Stat. 1214, as recognized in Evan v. Thompson, 465 F. Supp. 2d 62, 83 (D. Mass. 2006) (Insofar as Townsend held that 
the deliberate bypass standard is applicable in determining whether a federal habeas corpus petitioner is entitled to 
an evidentiary hearing on a claim that material facts were not adequately developed in state court proceedings, will be 
overruled by the Supreme Court).
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The United States is a conspicuous actor in the world theater, subject to the interests and incli-
nations of  other players, and possessing a similar, natural desire to shape the global community in a 
manner most favorable to its own objects.  The tendency to attempt to infl uence others is an inevi-
table symptom of  international heterogeneity and, at present, the United States is mired in an epic 
battle with fundamentalists bent on using terrorism as a means to repel,95 if  not destroy, America.96
American success in foreign policy depends on the internal assets available to and usable by the 
United States, including its soft power.  The law in America is an aspect of  its national soft power.  
In particular, the moderates in the Muslim world—the intended audience of  America’s soft power—
may fi nd attractive the American constitutional system of  governance in which 1) the people are the 
sovereign and the government consists of  merely temporary and recallable agents of  the people, 
2) federal power is diffused so as to diminish the possibility that any branch of  the government, or 
any of  them acting in tandem, can infringe upon the liberty of  the people, 3) structural protections 
notwithstanding, the people are entitled to certain substantive rights including the right to be free of  
governmental interference with respect to religious exercise, 4) the diversity of  interests inherent in 
its populace is considered a critical safeguard against the ability of  a majority group to oppress the 
minority constituents, 5) the courts are to ensure that the people’s rights to life, liberty, and property 
are not abridged, according to law, by the government or others, and 6) individuals deprived of  lib-
erty have available to them the writ of  habeas corpus to invoke the judiciary’s checking function as 
to executive detention decisions. 
The Constitution, in the eyes of  Judge Learned Hand, is “the best political document ever 
made.”97   If  the aforementioned constitutional principles are part of  the closest approximation to 
a just and reasoned society produced by man, surely they may have some persuasive appeal to the 
rest of  the world, including moderate Muslims who generally live in areas less respectful of  minority 
rights and religious pluralism. 
Such reverence is to be expected and warranted only if  the United States has remained true to 
these constitutional principles in practice, and in particular, in its behavior in the aftermath of  the 
9/11 attacks, when national stress is heightened and the option of  deviating from such values in 
favor of  an expedient “law of  necessity” similarly tempting.98
The extent to which the United States has remained true to itself  as a nation of  laws—and thus 
may credibly claim such legal soft power—is the subject of  the next section. 
II.  THE COURTS AND SOFT POWER
95  See EXECUTIVE SUMMARY, 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 2–3 (noting that Osama bin Laden and others 
issued a directive to operatives to kill Americans because of  the United States’ “‘occupation’ of  Islam’s holy places and 
aggression against Muslims.”).
96  See Michael Chertoff, Law, Loyalty, and Terror: Our Legal Response to the Post-9-11 World, WKLY. STANDARD, Dec. 1, 
2003, at 15 (“[al Qaeda’s] proclaimed  goal, however unrealistic, was to  destroy the  United  States.”). 
97  LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 252 (Irving Dillard ed., 1960). 
98  POSNER, supra note 26, at 70 (postulating that in the face of  national emergencies, including the post-9/11 world in 
which we live, there is a “law of  necessity” that “supersedes” the “law of  the Constitution.”); id. at 158 (defi ning the “law 
of  necessity” as not a “law” but the “trumping of  law by necessity.”).
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The Judiciary In Wartime
The United States has been charged with being unfaithful to its own laws and values in its 
prosecution of  the post-9/11 campaign against transnational terrorism.  With respect to its conduct 
outside of  the United States, following 9/11, America has been alleged to have tortured captured 
individuals in violation of  its domestic and international legal obligations,99 and detained individuals 
indefi nitely without basic legal protections.100 Closer to home, the United States is thought to have 
profi led Muslims, Arabs, and South Asians in airports and other settings,101 conducted immigration 
sweeps targeting Muslims,102 and engaged in mass preventative detention of  Muslims in the United 
States,103 among other things. 
These are serious claims.  The mere perception that they bear any resemblance to the truth 
undoubtedly impairs the way in which the United States is viewed by Muslims around the world, 
including Muslim-Americans, and thus diminishes the United States’ soft power resources.104  The 
degree to which they are valid degrades the ability of  the United States to argue persuasively that it 
99  See, e.g,. Marcy Strauss, The Lessons of  Abu Ghraib, 66 OHIO ST. L.J. 1269, 1296 (2005) (“The Bush administration in 
a variety of  ways conveyed at least an implicit approval of  the use of  interrogation tactics that at their worst crossed the 
line into torture, and at best constituted cruel and inhumane treatment.  Singly or in combination, the Administration’s 
refusal to acknowledge abusive practices for years, its production of  memoranda consistently embracing a possible use 
of  torture, its approval of  severe tactics in Guantanamo, its failure to cabin those tactics to that location, and its practice 
of  rendering terrorist suspects to other countries for aggressive questioning all conveyed a coherent message that was 
not lost on anyone: do what you need to get the information necessary to win the war on terror and the war in Iraq, and 
pay no heed to domestic or international law. ”).  
100  See, e.g., Kermit Roosevelt III, Detention and Interrogation in the Post-9/11 World, 42 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1, 23 (2008) 
(explaining that the Military Commissions Act, passed by Congress after 9/11, “authorizes the Executive to seize 
individuals, including lawful residents of  the United States, and to detain and interrogate them indefi nitely without access 
to courts.”).
101  See, e.g., Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law: Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of  Passion, 92 CAL. L. 
REV. 1259, 1267–70 (2004) (chronicling “‘public’ racial violence” against these groups).
102  See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Eric A. Posner, The Second-Order Structure of  Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810 
(2007) (“In the immediate aftermath of  the attacks, federal offi cials conducted sweeps in which they rounded up over a 
thousand noncitizens” where “[n]early all of  these noncitizens were from predominantly Muslim countries.”).
103  See, e.g., David Cole, Enemy Aliens, 54 STAN. L. REV. 953, 960 (2002) (asserting that “a feature of  the government’s 
response to the attacks of  September 11 has been its campaign of  mass preventive detention,” in which 1,147 individuals 
were detained by November of  2001).  
104  See e.g. Deborah Ramirez & Stephanie Woldenberg, Balancing Security and Liberty in a Post-September 11th World:  The 
Search for Common Sense in Domestic Counterterrorism Policy, 14 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 495, 495 (2005) (arguing that 
“racial  profi ling of  Arabs and  Muslims does not make operational sense because it fails to help in narrowing down a list 
of  potential terrorist subjects and succeeds only in  alienating . . . the largely untapped linguistic and cultural expertise 
that the Arab and Muslim communities can bring to the table with law enforcement in a joint effort to prevent future 
acts of  terrorism.”); Susan M. Akram & Maritza Karmely, Immigration and Constitutional Consequences of  Post-9/11 Policies 
Involving Arabs and Muslims in the United States: Is Alienage A Distinction without a Difference?, 38 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 609, 671 
(2005)  (concluding that “discrimination inherent in racial and religious  profi ling  alienates Arabs and  Muslims in the 
United States . . . inexorably leads[ing] to grievances that may ultimately result in violent acts against the government . . . 
.[.]  Government authorities themselves have indicated that alienating the very communities whose cooperation is needed 
for vital information on the ‘war on terror’ is counterproductive.”).
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not only touts the rule of  law, but exhibits actual fi delity to the law in times of  crisis. 
These claims relate to conduct of  the executive and/or the legislature in the aftermath of  the 
9/11 attacks.  This Article is concerned, however, with the judiciary, that is whether the courts have 
upheld the rule of  law in the post-9/11 context—and thus whether the courts may be a source of  
soft power today (even if  the other branches have engaged, or are alleged to have engaged, in con-
duct that is illegal or unwise).  
As to the courts, it is my contention that the judiciary has been faithful to the rule of  law after 
9/11 and as such should be considered a positive instrument of  American soft power.  Prior to dis-
cussing post-9/11 cases supporting this contention, it is important to provide a historical backdrop 
to relationship between the courts and wartime situations because judicial decision-making in cases 
implicating the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq does not take occur on a blank slate, despite the unique 
and modern circumstances of  the post-9/11 confl ict.  
The Constitution provides that “[t]he privilege of  the Writ of  Habeas Corpus shall not be sus-
pended, unless when in Cases of  Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”105  In Ex 
Parte Merryman, the Supreme Court was confronted with the question of  whether President Abra-
ham Lincoln’s suspension of  the writ of  the habeas corpus, which was a response to unrest in and 
around Baltimore, was lawful.106  The Court ruled that as Congress, not the Executive, possesses the 
power to suspend the writ, Lincoln’s actions were unconstitutional:107  “That the president, under the 
constitution of  the United States, cannot suspend the privilege of  the writ of  habeas corpus, nor 
authorize a military offi cer to do it.”108
In Ex parte Milligan, which also concerned Executive action during the Civil War, the Court as-
sessed the constitutionality of  the military tribunals created by President Lincoln to try Southern 
sympathizers in the North.109  The Court recognized that “[n]o graver question was ever considered 
by this court, nor one which more nearly concerns the rights of  the whole people,” than whether 
the tribunal possessed “the legal power and authority” to punish Lamdin P. Milligan, a citizen of  
the United States, resident and citizen of  the State of  Indiana, and suspected Southern supporter.110  
The Court held that Milligan’s military trial was unconstitutional—“[m]artial rule can never exist 
where courts are open, and in the proper and unobstructed exercise of  their jurisdiction.”111  The 
Court acknowledged the wartime context in which the military tribunals were established and the 
general national distress generated by the Civil War, but stated nonetheless that the “Constitution 
105  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see Daniel Michael, The Military Commissions Act of  2006, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473, 481 
(2006) (distinguishing between “the two forms of  habeas corpus-fi rst the statutory right embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
(which the jurisdiction-stripping provision amends), and second, ‘“the privilege of  the Writ of  Habeas Corpus,’” one of  
the few constitutional rights enshrined by the Framers in the original Constitution of  1787.”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, 
§ 9).
106  Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144 (C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487).
107  See id. at 148.
108  See id. at 147.
109  Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall) 2 (1866).
110  Id. at 118–19 (emphasis removed).
111  Id. at 127.
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of  the United States is a law for rulers and people, equally in war and in peace, and covers with the 
shield of  its protection all classes of  men, at all times, and under all circumstances.”112
In another wartime context, World War II, the Supreme Court decided in Ex parte Quirin wheth-
er President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s could try in a military tribunal eight German saboteurs captured 
on American soil during the war.113  The Court determined that the military tribunals constituted 
for this purpose were constitutional.114  Critically, Congress “explicitly provided” for the tribunals 
by law.115  FDR, according to the Court, simply “invoked that law” and “exercise[d] the authority 
conferred upon him by Congress” in instructing the trials to be performed “by the military arm of  
the nation in time of  war.”116
World War II triggered two other Supreme Court cases that are nothing if  not infamous:  Hi-
rabayashi v. United States117 and Korematsu v. United States.118  Following the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor, FDR issued an executive order,119 ratifi ed by Congress, designating areas of  exclusion and 
imposing curfew requirements applicable to persons of  Japanese ancestry.120  Gordon Hirabayashi, 
an American citizen of  Japanese ancestry, was convicted of  violating the order and subsequently 
contested the constitutionality of  the restrictions.121  The Court, acknowledging the racial undertones 
of  the case, upheld the government conduct in question, observing that, “[w]e cannot close our eyes 
to the fact, demonstrated by experience, that in time of  war residents having ethnic affi liations with 
an invading enemy may be a greater source of  danger than those of  a different ancestry.”122  
In Korematsu, Fred Korematsu, a natural-born United States citizen of  Japanese ancestry, chal-
lenged the forced exclusion and removal of  individuals of  Japanese ancestry from locations on the 
West Coast into Internment camps, actions made pursuant to the same executive order at issue in 
Hirabayashi.123  The Supreme Court similarly found constitutional this particular application of  the 
executive order.124  The Court rejected claims that the internment was premised on racial animus 
towards the Japanese, explaining instead that Korematsu was excluded because we are at war with 
the Japanese Empire, because the properly constituted military authorities feared an invasion of  
our West Coast and felt constrained to take proper security measures, because they decided that the 
military urgency of  the situation demanded that all citizens of  Japanese ancestry be segregated from 
112  Id. at 120–21.
113  Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942).
114  See id. at 44-45.
115  Id. at 28.
116  Id.
117  Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
118  Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1943).
119  Exec. Order No. 9066, 7 C.F.R. 1407 (Feb. 19, 1942).
120  See Hirabayashi, 320 U.S. 81.
121  See id.
122  Id. at 101.
123  See Korematsu, 323 U.S. 214.
124  See id. at 217-18 (explaining that in light of  its decision in Hirabayashi, the Court is unable to fi nd it beyond the war 
power of  Congress and the Executive to exclude citizens of  Japanese ancestry from the West Coast war area).
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the West Coast temporarily[.]125
Following the end of  the active hostilities in World War II, the Court agreed to decide whether 
it had jurisdiction over habeas petitions fi led by twenty-one German nationals detained in Germany 
and convicted by American military commissions of  violating the laws of  war.126  In Johnson v. Eisen-
trager, the Court held that constitutional habeas rights did not extend to these nationals because they 
were detained in an Allied prison outside of  the sovereign de jure jurisdiction of  the United States—
“in extending constitutional protections beyond the citizenry, the Court has been at pains to point 
out that it was the alien’s presence within its territorial jurisdiction that gave the Judiciary power to 
act.”127
The last wartime case of  greatest consequence prior to 9/11 is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, which concerned whether President Harry Truman could, in the context of  a military con-
fl ict in Korea, permissibly issue an executive order128 directing the Secretary of  Commerce to seize 
steel mills during the course of  a labor dispute at said mills in order to ensure the continued avail-
ability of  steel.129  The Court answered in the negative, stating that the President lacked the unilateral 
authority to act in this fashion.130  While the reasoning of  the Court was splintered, it is generally 
regarded that Justice Jackson’s concurrence contains the operative legal principle pertaining to the 
legitimacy of  presidential wartime action.131  Justice Jackson wrote that “[w]hen the President acts 
pursuant to an express or implied authorization of  Congress, his authority is at its maximum,”132 
“[w]hen the President acts in absence of  either a congressional grant or denial of  authority, he can 
only rely upon his own independent powers,”133 and “[w]hen the President takes measures incompat-
ible with the expressed or implied will of  Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb[.]”134
It may be fair to say that these notable wartime cases have produced “mixed” results.  If  one was 
to view these cases through the non-government/government prism, some cases appear to reject 
robust government projections of  authority (e.g., Ex Parte Merryman), while others have sanctioned 
government action based on the coordinated support of  the other federal branches (e.g., Ex parte 
Quirin).  Others who may opt for a binary civil libertarian vs. security hawk perspective similarly 
may fi nd that the Supreme Court has protected individual/private rights in some instances (e.g., 
Youngstown Sheet), while others may be pleased that the Court has pragmatically deferred to military 
125  Id. at 223.
126  See Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
127  Id. at 771.
128  Exec. Order No. 10340, 17 C.F.R. 3139 (Apr. 8, 1952).
129  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952)..
130  See id. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring) (noting that “[p]residential powers are not fi xed, but fl uctuate, depending 
upon their disjunction or conjunction with those of  Congress.”).
131  Harold H. Bruff, Judicial Review and the President’s Statutory Powers, 68 VA. L. REV. 1, 12 (1982) (considering Justice 
Jackson’s Steel Seizure concurrence to have “most infl uenced” the analysis on the relationship between presidential 
power and Congress) (citing Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 661 (1981) (noting that the opinion has brought 
together “as much combination of  analysis and common sense as there is in this area[.]”)).
132  Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 635 (Jackson, J., concurring).
133  Id. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
134  Id. (Jackson, J., concurring).
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necessity over the individual (e.g., Korematsu).  In terms of  the rule of  law, the Court indicated that 
the civil courts may hear wartime cases when open (e.g., Ex parte Milligan), yet the Court has also 
left individuals outside of  Article III courts altogether (e.g., Eisentrager).  The results of  these cases 
are thus “mixed” in the sense that no one “side” has a monopoly over the Court’s wartime decision-
making.
If  it is the case that the Court’s behavior in cases arising in the context of  war, as a historical 
matter, has been varied, what of  the Court’s wartime cases from the post-9/11 era?  The Court’s 
resolution of  seminal cases implicating governmental power and individual rights in the aftermath 
of  the post-9/11 attacks is the subject of  the next section.135 
The Judiciary in the Post-9/11 Context 
On September 18, 2001, a week after the attacks, Congress enacted into law the Authorization 
for Use of  Military Force (AUMF), which authorized the President to “use all necessary and ap-
propriate force against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, 
committed, or aided the terrorist attacks” or “harbored such organizations or persons, in order to 
prevent any future acts of  international terrorism against the United States by such nations, organi-
zations or persons.”136  President George W. Bush invoked this congressionally-supplied authority to, 
among other things, deploy “Armed Forces into Afghanistan to wage a military campaign against al 
Qaeda and the Taliban regime that had supported it.”137  
On one day, June 28, 2004, the Supreme Court issued the fi rst three decisions respecting the 
government’s actions under the AUMF.  The fi rst case, Rumfeld v. Padilla, was set in motion by Presi-
dent Bush’s order, issued pursuant to the AUMF, to then–Secretary of  Defense Donald Rumsfeld 
to designate Jose Padilla an “enemy combatant.”138  Padilla, a United States citizen, was captured in 
Chicago’s O’Hare Airport on the charge of  being an alleged a material witness to terrorism and was 
subsequently detained in a naval brig in Charleston, South Carolina.139  After Padilla was transferred, 
his counsel fi led a 28 U.S.C. § 2241 habeas petition in the Southern District of  New York, naming 
President Bush, Secretary Rumsfeld, and the commander of  the brig as respondents.140  The govern-
ment moved to dismiss the petition, arguing that, as a habeas petition is to be fi led against the peti-
135  As with the pre-9/11 cases, the following discussion of  these post-9/11 cases is not intended to be 
comprehensive or normative -- rather it is to serve the simple purpose of  informing the reader of  the basic nature, 
substance, and outcome of  these cases with a degree of  specifi city to permit the reader to appreciate the contents of  
judicial review and the interplay of  various elements of  legal soft power.
136  Authorization for Use of  Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2, 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001).
137  Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466, 470 (2004).  
138  Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 431 (2004). See generally William Haynes, Memorandum on Enemy Combatants, 
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS (Dec. 12, 2002), available at http://www.cfr.org/publication.html?id=5312 (explaining 
that “[a]n ‘enemy combatant’ is an individual who, under the laws and customs of  war, may be detained for the duration 
of  an armed confl ict. In the current confl ict with al Qaida and the Taliban, the term includes a member, agent, or 
associate of  al Qaida or the Taliban.”)..
139  See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 432.
140  See id. 
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tioner’s custodian,141 the brig commander was the only proper respondent and that the commander 
is located outside of  the jurisdiction of  the Southern District of  New York.142  The government 
further contended that, even assuming that the district court in New York has jurisdiction over the 
commander, President Bush has the authority to detain Padilla in the brig under the AUMF.143  
The district court determined that Rumsfeld was a suffi cient custodian because of  his involve-
ment in the detention and that the court could assert jurisdiction over Rumsfeld under New York’s 
long–arm statute, but as to the merits, President Bush has the authority to hold Padilla in military 
custody on the naval brig.144  The U.S. Court of  Appeals for the Second Circuit agreed with the 
district court’s jurisdictional conclusion, but held that the President was without the constitutional 
or statutory power to authorize the military detention of  an America citizen captured on American 
soil.145
The Supreme Court reversed.  The Court explained that, as a habeas petition is to be directed 
against the person with the power to physically produce a petitioner in custody (much like a jailer or 
warden),146 the commander of  the brig at which Padilla was being held is the only proper respondent 
in this action.147  The Court rejected Padilla’s argument that the district court in New York retained 
jurisdiction over Padilla on the grounds that “Padilla was moved from New York to South Carolina 
before his lawyer fi led a habeas petition on his behalf.”148  The Court further noted that, because 
the petition could be fi led only against the brig commander, jurisdiction lies in the district of  con-
fi nement.149  Taking these two principles together, the Court held that, “Whenever a § 2241 habeas 
petitioner seeks to challenge his present physical custody within the United States, he should name 
his warden as respondent and fi le the petition in the district of  confi nement.”150  In other words, 
Padilla should have brought the habeas action in South Carolina, not the Southern District of  New 
York.151  Accordingly, the Court dismissed the petition for want of  jurisdiction and declined to ad-
dress the merits question of  whether the President possessed the authority to detain Padilla, saving it 
for another case. 
In Rasul v. Bush, fourteen Kuwaitis and Australians—captured during the Afghanistan confl ict 
141  See 28 U.S.C. § 2243 (“The writ, or order to show cause shall be directed to the person having custody of  
the person detained.”); see also 28 U.S.C. § 2242 (“It shall allege the facts concerning the applicant’s commitment or 
detention, the name of  the person who has custody over him[.]”).
142  See Padilla, 542 U.S. at 432.
143  See id.
144  See id. at 432–33.
145  See id. at 433–34.
146  See id. at 434–36.
147  See id. at 442 (fi nding that the brig commander was Padilla’s custodian and thus the proper respondent to Padilla’s 
habeas petition).
148  Id. at 441.
149  See id. at 443 (fi nding that “the Great Writ is ‘issuable only in the district of  confi nement.’”) (quoting Carbo v. 
United States, 364 U.S. 611, 618 (1961)).
150  Id. at 447.
151  See id. at 450–51 (holding that “[t]he District of  South Carolina, not the Southern District of  New York, was the 
district court in which Padilla should have brought his habeas petition.”).
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and detained in Guantánamo without charge or hearing—fi led writs of  habeas corpus pursuant to 
Section 2241 in which they challenged the basis of  their detention and argued that they did not com-
mit any wrongdoing related to the confl ict in Afghanistan.152  The touchstone of  the legal dispute 
was whether federal courts had jurisdiction to review statutory habeas petitions fi led by aliens held in 
Guantánamo.153  The statutory writ of  habeas corpus was created by Congress and is codifi ed at 28 
U.S.C. § 2241, as distinct from the constitutional writ, which derives from the Constitution’s express 
declaration that “The privilege of  the Writ of  Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when 
in Cases of  Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”154  The district court and U.S. 
Court of  Appeals for the D.C. Circuit determined that they did not have jurisdiction to hear writs 
fi led by those in Guantánamo, relying on Eisentrager for the proposition that statutory habeas rights 
do not extend to aliens detained outside of  the sovereign de jure territory of  the United States.155  
The Supreme Court reversed, clarifying that Eisentrager does not categorically restrict statutory 
habeas jurisdiction to situations in which a detainee is located within the territorial jurisdiction of  the 
United States.156  Instead, the Court held, federal courts’ statutory habeas jurisdiction extends to the 
formal territorial borders and may also reach places over which the United States exercises plenary 
and exclusive control.157  Here, habeas runs because the United States exerts “‘complete jurisdiction 
and control’ over the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, and may continue to exercise such control per-
manently if  it so chooses.”158   Moreover, the Court made clear that statutory habeas protections may 
be sought by citizens as well as foreign nationals held in federal custody.159  As no party disputed that 
the district court in question had jurisdiction over the custodians,160 the central issue in Padilla, the 
Court found that the Section 2241 petition could be heard. 
Whereas Padilla and Rasul dealt with jurisdiction, the third case, Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, spoke to pro-
cess.  This case was brought by Yaser Hamdi, who was captured in the course of  the American cam-
paign against al-Qaeda in Afghanistan and who challenged whether he could be indefi nitely detained 
152  See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 470–72.
153  Id. at 542 U.S. 470 (“[this case] present[s] the narrow but important question whether United States courts lack 
jurisdiction to consider challenges to the legality of  the detention of  foreign nationals captured abroad in connection 
with hostilities and incarcerated at the Guantanamo Bay Naval Base, Cuba466.”).
154  U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9; see Daniel Michael, The Military Commissions Act of  2006, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 473, 481 
(2006) (distinguishing between “the two forms of  habeas corpus— fi rst the statutory righ t embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 2241 
(which the jurisdiction-stripping provision amends), and second, ‘“the privilege of  the Writ of  Habeas Corpus,’ one of  
the few constitutional rights enshrine d by the Framers in the original Constitution of  1787.”) (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I , 
§ 9).
155  See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 472–73 (citing Rasul v. Bush, 215 F.Supp.2d 55, 68 (D.D.C. 2002); al Odah v. Bush, 321 F.3d 
1134, 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2003)).
156  See id. at 478–79.
157  See id. at 481–82 (noting that, historically, habeas extends to “all other dominions under the sovereign’s control.”).
158  Id. at 480 (citation omitted).
159  See id. at 481 (fi nding that “there is little reason to think that Congress intended the geographical coverage of  
the statue to vary depending on the detainee’s citizenship.  Aliens held at the base, no less than American citizens, are 
entitled to invoke the federal courts’ authority under § 2241.”).
160  See id. at 483 (noting that “[n]o party questions the District Court’s jurisdiction over petitioners’ custodians.”).
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without the opportunity to contest the basis of  his detention.161  The factual circumstances sur-
rounding Hamdi’s detention differed from those present in Rasul in that Hamdi was designated by 
the government as an “enemy combatant,” was an American citizen, and was initially held in Guan-
tánamo but transferred to the territorial United States (specifi cally, a naval brig in Charleston, South 
Carolina) upon the government learning that Hamdi was a citizen.162  Hamdi’s father fi led a Section 
2241 habeas petition on his son’s behalf, claiming that Hamdi was in Afghanistan for humanitarian 
purposes and was not involved with any fi ghting related to al-Qaeda.163  The question thus became 
what process, if  any, should be afforded to “a United States citizen on United States soil [labeled] an 
‘enemy combatant[.]’”164  
The district court ordered the government to turn over certain materials which the court 
deemed “were necessary for ‘meaningful judicial review’ of  whether Hamdi’s detention was legally 
authorized and whether Hamdi had received suffi cient process[.]”165  The U.S. Court of  Appeals 
for the Fourth Circuit reversed, stating that, as “‘Hamdi was captured in a zone of  active combat in 
a foreign theater of  confl ict,’ no factual inquiry or evidentiary hearing allowing Hamdi to be heard 
or to rebut the Government’s assertions was necessary or proper.”166  Drawing on Ex Parte Quirin, 
the circuit court stated that Hamdi’s American citizenship and American detention location did 
not affect this constitutional conclusion because Hamdi was “present in a zone of  active combat 
operations[.]”167  With respect to the courts’ role, the circuit court noted that, because the Constitu-
tion did not assign specifi c war powers to federal courts,168 “separation of  powers principles prohib-
ited a federal court from ‘delving further into Hamdi’s status and capture.’”169  In any case, the circuit 
court added, Congress had authorized detentions of  this sort as the “‘necessary and appropriate 
force referenced in the [AUMF] necessarily includes the capture and detention of  any and all hostile 
forces arrayed against our troops.’”170  
On review, the Supreme Court fi rst accepted the government’s position and agreed with the 
Fourth Circuit “that Congress has in fact authorized Hamdi’s detention, through the AUMF[.]”171  It 
also acknowledged, citing to Ex Parte Quirin, that “[t]here is no bar to this Nation’s holding one of  
its own citizens as an enemy combatant,”172 and distinguished Ex Parte Milligan on the grounds that 
Milligan was not a prisoner of  war, whereas here Hamdi is alleged to have raised arms against the 
161  Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
162  See id. at 510–11.
163  See id. at 511–12.
164  Id. at 509.
165  Id. at 514–15 (citation omitted).
166  Id. (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003)).
167  Id. at 516 (quoting Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 475).
168  See id. at 514–15; Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 459 (4th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 540 U.S. 1099 (2004), vacated, 542 
U.S. 507 (2004)).Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 463.
169  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 515 (quoting Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 473) (brackets removed).
170  Id. (quoting Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 467) (internal quotes omitted).
171  Id. at 517.
172  Id. at 519.
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United States.173  
The Court insisted that even if  the underlying detention may be congressionally authorized, 
“there remains the question of  what process is constitutionally due to a citizen who disputes his 
enemy–combatant status.”174  On this point, the Court held that “due process demands that a citizen 
held in the United States as an enemy combatant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the 
factual basis for that detention before a neutral decision-maker.”175  Put differently, “a citizen–detain-
ee seeking to challenge his classifi cation as an enemy combatant must receive notice of  the factual 
basis for his classifi cation, and a fair opportunity to rebut the Government’s factual assertions before 
a neutral decision-maker.”176
With respect to Hamdi’s specifi c circumstances, the Court held that he “received no process” – 
that is, his being interrogated by his captors fell short of  the “constitutionally adequate factfi nding 
before a neutral decision-maker.”177  As to ju dicial review in this area more generally, the Court left 
open the possibility that process “could be met by an appropriately authorized and properly consti-
tuted military tribunal.”178 
 Finally, the Court rebuked the Fourth Circuit’s suggestion that the Constitution did not contem-
plate a war powers function for the federal courts.  The Court, citing to Youngstown Sheet, noted that, 
“We have long since made clear that a state of  war is not a blank check for the President when it 
comes to the rights of  the Nation’s citizens.”179  Further, “Whatever power the United States Consti-
tution envisions for the Executive in its exchanges with other nations or with enemy organizations 
in times of  confl ict, it most assuredly envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties 
are at stake.”180  More to the point, the Court stated that “the Great Writ of  habeas corpus allows 
the Judicial Branch to play a necessary role in maintaining this delicate balance of  governance, serv-
ing as an important judicial check on the Executive’s discretion in the realm of  detentions.”181
Following the 2004 Term, the Supreme Court issued a landmark opinion in Hamdan v. 
Rumsfeld,182 which has been called the “the most important decision on presidential power and the 
173  See id. at 521–22 (explaining that in Milligan, the Court’s decision was based in large part on the fact that Milligan 
was an Indiana resident arrested in his home and, had Milligan been captured while carrying arms against Union troops, 
the Court’s holding may have been different) (citation omitted); id. at 22 n.1 (reiterating that in the instant case, “the basis 
for detention by the military is that Hamdi was carrying a weapon against American troops on a foreign battlefi eld; that 
is, that he was an enemy combatant.”).
174  Id. at 524.
175  Id. at 509.
176  Id. at 533.
177  Id. at 537.
178  Id. at 538.
179  Id. at 536 (citing Youngstown Sheet, 343 U.S. at 587).
180  Id.
181  Id.
182  Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
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rule of  law ever.”183  The Court addressed the question left open by Hamdi, namely whether the 
military commissions established by the Executive to try “enemy combatants” comport with the law, 
specifi cally in this case the Uniform Code of  Military Justice (UCMJ)184 and the Geneva Conven-
tions.185  The case was brought by Salim Hamdan—a Yemeni national alleged to have been a driver 
and bodyguard for Osama bin Laden—who was captured in Afghanistan, detained in Guantánamo, 
and designated by President Bush as an “enemy combatant” triable by military commission.186  Fol-
lowing the decision to subject Hamdan to a military commission, Hamdan’s military counsel made 
demands pursuant to the UCMJ.187  The convened military authorities determined, however, that 
Hamdan was not entitled to the protections of  the UCMJ.188  Hamdan fi led a habeas petition after 
which formal charges were lodged by the government.189
The district court granted Hamdan’s petition, stayed Hamdan’s military commission proceedings, 
and ruled, in part, that “the military commission convened to try him was established in violation of  
both the UCMJ and Common Article 3 of  the Third Geneva Convention because it had the power 
to convict based on evidence the accused would never see or hear.”190  The U.S. Court of  Appeals 
for the D.C. Circuit reversed—while it entertained the habeas petition, it rejected the district court’s 
conclusions that Hamdan could invoke Common Article 3 and that the military commissions vio-
lated the UCMJ and the Geneva Conventions.191
In 2005, the Supreme Court granted certiorari.192  In 2006, Congress enacted the Detainee Treat-
ment Act (DTA), which, in part, divested federal courts of  jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions fi led 
by aliens held in Guantánamo.193  The government therefore sought to dismiss the writ of  certiorari 
on the grounds that the Supreme Court lacked jurisdiction to review the circuit court’s decision.194  
The Court denied the government’s motion, reasoning that the jurisdiction-stripping provision of  
183  Jenny S. Martinez, Process and Substance in the “War on Terror,” 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1013, 1054 (2008) (quoting 
Walter Dellinger, The Most Important Decision on Presidential Power. Ever., SLATE, June 29, 2006, available at http://www.slate.
com/id/2144476/entry/2144825/); see Ernest A. Young, The Constitution Outside the Constitution, 117 YALE L.J. 408, 436 
(2007) (stating that “[Hamdan] “may be the most important separation-of-powers decision in a  generation.”).
184  10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 et seq. (2006). 
185  Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of  Prisoners of  War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 
T.I.A.S. No. 3364, Feb. 2, 1956 [hereinafter “Geneva Convention”].
186  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 566–69 (noting that Hamdan’s status was determined by the President on July 3, 2003 
under the November 13, 2001 “Detention, Treatment, and Trial of  Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism” 
Order).
187  See id. at 569 (noting that Hamdan was appointed counsel in December 2003).
188  See id.
189  See id. (remarking that the Government did not charge Hamdan with a crime until a year after his initial 
determination under the November 13, 2001 Order).
190  See id. at 571.
191  See .id. at 571–72 (commenting that the U.S. Court of  Appeals for the D.C. Circuit did not fi nd the Geneva 
Conventions as “judicially enforceable” treaties).
192  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 546 U.S. 1002 (2005).
193  Detainee Treatment Act of  2005, Pub.L. No. 109-148, 119 Stat. 2739.
194  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 576–77.
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the DTA did not, by its own terms, apply retroactively and thus to Hamdan’s petition.195  The gov-
ernment next contended that, even if  the Court had jurisdiction, principles of  comity require the 
Court to await the outcome of  the military commission prior to hearing Hamdan’s challenges to the 
commission itself.196  The Court declined the government’s invitation to hold off—the military com-
missions, the Court held, were insuffi ciently constituted to evoke comity considerations generally 
accorded other judicial bodies and the parties possess a compelling interest in knowing in advance 
whether the military commissions were legally adequate.197  
The Court therefore turned to the crux of  the case—whether the military commissions estab-
lished by the President were lawful.198  The Court noted that Congress merely referenced, but not 
did expressly authorize, the President’s ability to convene Hamdan’s military commission.199  Accord-
ingly, the Court inquired as to whether the military commissions were nonetheless authorized by the 
Constitution and laws of  the United States.200  Military commissions, the Court explained, are proper 
if  it premised on military necessity and, specifi cally if  it is convened as an incident to war and to de-
termine, factually, if  an adversary has transgressed the law of  war in an active theatre of  war.201  The 
Court determined that, in this case, Hamdan is charged with conspiracy, however conspiracy is not a 
violation of  the law of  war and, in any case, Hamdan is not alleged to have committed a recognized 
violation in a theatre of  war.202  
Further, the Court ruled, the commissions themselves are not consistent with American legal 
obligations.  Specifi cally, the military commissions’ procedural and evidentiary rules for defendants 
are weaker than those mandated by UCMJ courts-martial and these differences are not justifi ed by 
any military exigencies or practical needs.203  The Court also found that the confl ict with al-Qaeda 
is suffi cient to trigger Common Article 3, which requires trials of  adversaries to be conducted by 
“regularly constitute d court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized as indispens-
able by civilized peoples.”204  As the commissions materially deviated from the regularly constituted 
courts-martial, the commissions fell short of  the minimum requirements demanded by Common 
195  See id. at 575–84 (fi nding evidence that Congress deliberately intended the jurisdiction-stripping provisions to not 
apply to pending cases because of  “deliberate omissions” in the text of  the act).
196  See id. at 584–85.
197  See id. at 585–90 (distinguishing Hamdan’s case from Councilman because Hamdan does not involve the unique 
position of  an established military court proceeding involving a member of  the United States armed forces).
198  See id. at 595.
199  See id. at 591–95 (remarking that the Supreme Court does not answer the question whether the President can 
convene military commissions without Congress’s approval in exceptional circumstances).
200  See Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 595–96 (noting that there is little precedent on the legality of  military commissions 
because few examples of  military commissions have existed in the past and only in exceptional circumstances).
201  See id. at 596–97 (naming this precedent as the “law-of-war” model based on Quirin and Yamashita).
202  See id. at 599–600 (“The offense [the commission] alleges is not triable by law-of-war military commission.”).
203  See id. at 613–24 (commenting on the careful balance that needs to be struck between adequate procedures and 
the “true exigenc[ies]” which exist in times of  war).
204  Id. at 631–32 (quoting Geneva Convention, Art. 3, ¶ 1 (d), 6 U.S.T. at 3320).
95NATIONAL SECURITY LAW BRIEFVol. 1, No. 1
Article 3.205  To fi ll the gap, the Court added, Hamdan must be present for his trial and privy to the 
evidence against him.206  The Court therefore concluded that the military commissions convened by 
the Executive must comply with the law, however the particular commissions convened the Presi-
dent Bush to try Hamdan violated both the UCMJ and Geneva Conventions.207
The Supreme Court’s next major foray into the post-9/11 wartime cases came the 2008 case of  
Boumediene v. Bush.208  While Rasul determined that federal courts have jurisdiction to hear Section 
2241 habeas petitions fi led by aliens imprisoned in Guantánamo, Boumediene resolved whether certain 
aliens—determined to be “enemy combatants” by the government and held in Guantánamo—are 
entitled to the constitutional habeas privilege.209  District court judges were split on the issue.210  
Congress subsequently passed, in response to the Court’s ruling in Hamdan that the DTA did not 
apply retroactively, the Military Commissions Act (MCA)211, which stripped the federal courts of  
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions fi led by aliens held in Guantánamo, including those petitions 
that were pending at the time of  the MCA’s enactment.212  The U.S. Court of  Appeals for the D.C. 
Circuit, which the MCA provided with exclusive jurisdiction to review enemy combatant determina-
tions, held that the MCA denied to federal courts jurisdiction over the petitioners’ habeas challenges 
and that the petitioners were not entitled to constitutional habeas protections.213
The Supreme Court’s approach to the case may be summarized with the following framework:  
under the Suspension Clause of  the Constitution, the constitutional habeas privilege applies unless 
formally suspended;214 the MCA deprives the Court of  habeas jurisdiction, but the parties do not 
dispute that the MCA is not a formal suspension of  the privilege;215 accordingly, the MCA is un-
constitutional as applied to the petitioners if  the petitioners are entitled to the constitutional habeas 
205  See id. at 631–34 (noting that although the Geneva Conventions do not defi ne what minimum requirements 
constitute, minimum requirements must include the essential trial protections under customary international law).
206  See id. at 634 (“Common Article 3 obviously tolerates a great degree of  fl exibility in trying individuals captured 
during armed confl icts; its requirements are general ones . . . [b]ut requirements they are nonetheless.”).
207  See id. at 635.
208  Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. 2229.
209  See id. at 2240 (noting that subject to exceptions under the Suspension Clause, habeas corpus should not be 
withdrawn).
210  See Khalid v. Bush, 355 F. Supp. 2d 311 (D. D.C. 2005) (holding that petitioners’ rights could not be vindicated 
by way of  constitutional habeas instrument); In re Guantanamo Detainee Cases, 355 F. Supp. 2d 443, 481 (D.D.C. 2005) 
(holding that petitioners were entitled to due process rights).
211  See Military C ommissions Act, § 7 (a)(1), codifi ed as 28 U.S.C. § 2241(e)(1).
212  See Boumediene, 128 S.Ct. at 2241–42.
213  See id. at 2242 (noting that the circuit court determination did not reach the question of  whether the DTA 
provided an adequate substitute for habeas corpus because it found that the petitions were not entitled constitutional 
habeas protections under the Suspension Clause); see also Boumediene v. Bush, 476 F.3d 981 (D.C. Cir. 2007) (circuit court 
ruling).
214  See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9 (“The privilege of  the Writ of  Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of  Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.”).
215  See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (“The MCA does not purport to be a formal suspension of  the writ; and the 
Government, in its submissions to us, has not argued that it is.”).
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privilege.216  While the government argued that habeas is limited to the territorial borders and areas 
over which the United States retains de jure sovereignty, the Court concluded that the habeas privilege 
extends to the detainees held in Guantánamo217 because the United States exercises de facto control 
over Guantánamo.218   As a result, under the Court’s functional analysis, the petitioners may invoke 
the habeas privilege, and the MCA is unconstitutional as applied to them because it does not formal-
ly suspend the habeas privilege in conformance with the Suspension Clause.219  The Court also held 
that the DTA’s review procedures were an inadequate substitute for habeas review given the circum-
scribed factfi nding role, evidentiary limitations, and adversarial structure of  the DTA tribunals.220
In the last full-term, OT 2009, the Supreme Court issued Ashcroft v. Iqbal, a case which touched 
upon the legality of  profi ling in the national security context and qualifi ed immunity for government 
offi cials accused of  wrongdoing in post-9/11 investigative or security activities.221  The case was 
brought by a Muslim—a Pakistani national arrested in weeks after 9/11 for charges related to iden-
tity theft and thereafter housed in a detention facility in New York—alleging that he was mistreated, 
segregated and placed in a highly restrictive prison unit simply because of  his race, religion, and 
national origin, and not because of  any tie to terrorism.222  John Ashcroft, then-Attorney General, 
and Robert Mueller, Director of  the Federal Bureau of  Investigation, were named as defendants for 
allegedly designing the discriminatory policy that the plaintiff  alleges he was mistreated under, and 
at a minimum, for approving the discriminatory behavior of  their subordinates.223  These high-level 
government offi cials moved to dismiss, arguing that the plaintiff ’s complaint insuffi ciently detailed 
216  See id. at 2244 (asking “whether petitioners are barred from seeking the writ or invoking the protections of  the 
Suspension Clause[.]”); id. at 2248 (describing “the specifi c question before” the Court has “whether foreign nationals, 
apprehended and detained in distant countries during a time of  serious threats to our Nation’s security, may assert the 
privilege of  the writ and seek its protection.”).
217  See Boumediene, 128 S. Ct. at 2262 (noting that this case “lack[s] any precise historical parallel” and therefore the 
fact that the Court has never held that “noncitizens detained by our Government in territory over which another country 
maintains de jure sovereignty have any rights under our Constitution” is not dispositive).
218  See id. at 2248 (suggesting that federal courts may hear “a petition for a writ of  habeas corpus brought by a 
prisoner deemed an enemy combatant . . . when held in a territory, like Guantanamo, over which the Government has 
total military and civil control.”); id. at 2258 (“questions of  extraterritoriality turn on objective factors and practical 
concerns, not formalism.”); id. at 2261 (holding that the writ extended to the petitioners in Guantánamo because of  the 
“plenary control the United States asserts over the base”).  The Court distinguished the present facts with those present 
in Eisentrager, as in that case “the United States’ control over the prison in Germany was neither absolute nor indefi nite.”  
Id. at 2260. 
219  See id. at 2262 (“We hold that Art. I, § 9, cl. 2, of  the Constitution has full effect at Guantanamo Bay. If  the 
privilege of  habeas corpus is to be denied to the detainees now before us, Congress must act in accordance with the 
requirements of  the Suspension Clause. . . . The MCA does not purport to be a formal suspension of  the writ. . . . 
Petitioners, therefore, are entitled to the privilege of  habeas corpus to challenge the legality of  their detention.”).
220  See id. at 2274 (noting that the Supreme Court did not fi nd it necessary to reach “the claims of  unlawful 
conditions of  treatment or confi nement” at Guantanamo Bay).
221  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009).
222  See id. at 1943–44 (alleging jailors physically assaulted and strip searched him without justifi cation and would also 
not let him pray).
223  See id. at 1944 (alleging Ashcroft as the principle designer of  the policy and Mueller as the primary promoter of  
the implementation of  the policy).
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any direct wrongdoing on their part to overcome their entitlement to qualifi ed immunity.224  The 
district court denied the motion, and the circuit court affi rmed on appeal.225
The Supreme Court reversed.  With respect to the adequacy of  the allegations, the Court held 
that they were either “bald assertions” not entitled to an assumption of  truth226 or are simply not 
“plausible” even if  accepted as true.227  In the course of  doing so, the Court found unremarkable the 
possibility that the government would target Muslims in the wake of  the 9/11 attacks: 
The September 11 attacks were perpetrated by 19 Arab Muslim hijackers who counted them-
selves members in good standing of  al Qaeda, an Islamic fundamentalist group. Al Qaeda was 
headed by another Arab Muslim-Osama bin Laden-and composed in large part of  his Arab Muslim 
disciples. It should come as no surprise that a legitimate policy directing law enforcement to ar-
rest and detain individuals because of  their suspected link to the attacks would produce a disparate, 
incidental impact on Arab Muslims, even though the purpose of  the policy was to target neither 
Arabs nor Muslims. On the facts respondent alleges the arrests Mueller oversaw were likely lawful 
and justifi ed by his nondiscriminatory intent to detain aliens who were illegally present in the United 
States and who had potential connections to those who committed terrorist acts.228
The targeting of  Muslims was, the Court found, consistent with lawful conduct and thus the 
plaintiff  had not suffi ciently alleged actionable acts by the defendants at the pleadings stage.229   
 Borrowing the same analytical devices used to examine the pre-9/11 cases, it would ap-
pear that the results of  the post-9/11 are similarly “mixed.”  The Supreme Court ruled in favor of  
the government in some cases (e.g., Padilla), but not in others (e.g., Rasul).  Civil libertarians may be 
inclined to celebrate cases like Hamdi, while national security hawks Iqbal.  With respect to the rule 
of  law, the Court solidifi ed the expanded scope of  habeas protections in Rasul and Boumediene, but 
placed certain cases outside of  the reach of  judicial review, at least as they were plead, in Padilla and 
Iqbal. 
If  the intended audience of  any legal soft power is moderate Muslims, another layer of  assess-
ment may be added, namely whether Muslim plaintiffs or petitioners were successful in their cases 
before the Supreme Court.  On this score, the results, again, resist uniformity.  Specifi cally, Muslims 
prevailed in Rasul, Hamdi, Hamdan, and Boumediene, but were rebuffed in Padilla and Iqbal.  While 
Padilla was a “loss” on jurisdictional grounds, Iqbal is far more problematic, as I have aggressively 
suggested elsewhere, in large part because the Court effectively sanitized blanket profi ling in a man-
224  See id.
225  See id. at 1944–45.
226  Id. at 1951; see id. (“It is the conclusory nature of  respondent’s allegations, rather than their extravagantly fanciful 
nature, that disentitles them to the presumption of  truth.”).
227  Id. at 1951 (“Taken as true, these allegations are consistent with petitioners’ purposefully designating detainees 
“of  high interest” because of  their race, religion, or national origin. But given more likely explanations, they do not 
plausibly establish this purpose.”).
228  Id.
229  See id. at 1951–52.
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ner eerily similar of  Korematsu.230
The Message to Moderate Muslims
If  it is the case that the Court itself  did not rule in favor of  Muslim interests in post-9/11 cases, 
and at least in one case appears to be quite hostile to or dismissive of  Muslim claims of  discrimi-
nation, how can American judicial review serve to attract moderate Muslims to the United States?  
Simply, because the essence and allure of  judicial review is the legitimate and peaceful process 
itself—not the substantive outcomes of  particular cases.  For example, libertarians, civil libertarians, 
rule of  law advocates, and Muslims may be particularly pleased with the decision handed down in 
Hamdan because a Muslim detainee prevailed against the government.  But in the context of  legal 
soft power, Hamdan must be viewed as an affi rmation of  the American principle of  judicial review 
and the American constitutional design more generally, as well as a refl ection of  other vital legal 
values, including the separation of  powers and the limited authority of  the federal government.  
Indeed, Hamdan’s lead counsel, Neal Katyal -- perhaps the one person aside from Hamdan with 
the greatest reason to be especially pleased with the substantive outcome of  the Court’s decision—
reminded individuals just one day after the opinion was handed down that Hamdan was not a victory 
for one party, but ultimately a tribute to the American system of  laws and thus to America:  
[On] the lesson of  the decision more generally. . . . I had hoped that when we won that the 
administration would just take a deep breath and think to themselves, ‘well this is actually something 
great about America.’ 
Presidents make mistakes. . . . I don’t think that this [decision] is a rebuke to the Bush adminis-
tration per se; I think the Founders anticipated that presidents are going to push their power. But, 
what’s great about America, it seems to me, is that we have a court system . . .  that checks the Presi-
dent and allows this guy [Hamdan]—a fourth-grade educated Yemini accused of  conspiring with 
one of  the worst individuals on the planet, Osama bin Laden—[to] sue the . . . world’s highest, most 
powerful offi cial, the President of  the United States, and says ‘you’re doing something illegal to me, 
you’re violating your own basic laws.’
What other nation on earth allows people to do that? It’s a great thing about America. We should 
be celebrating it, I think, and I think the administration should celebrate it as well because it says that 
we’re different.231
It is this in this same spirit that the judiciary’s post-9/11 activities should be adjudged and ex-
posed for foreign policy purposes.  Hamdan happened to be victorious in his case, but there can be 
little doubt that in each of  the other post-9/11 cases discussed here the litigants went through the 
same open process in which impartial judges, bound by known procedures and precedents, attempt-
230  See Dawinder S. Sidhu, First Korematsu and Now Ashcroft v. Iqbal: The Latest Chapter in the Wartime Supreme Court’s 
Disregard for Claims of  Discrimination, 58 BUFF. L. REV. ____ (forthcoming, 2010), (draft available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1478787).
231  Video recording:  Comments by Neal Katyal at Successes and Challenges in Terrorism Prosecutions, held at the 
American Enterprise Institute (June 30, 2006), available at http://www.aei.org/video/100593 (follow “PLAY FULL 
VIDEO” hyperlink) [hereinafter, Katyal, Successes and Challenges in Terrorism].
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ed, in good faith and based on the law, to reach a decision that’s faithful to existing caselaw, statutes, 
and the Constitution as a whole.   
The regularity and legitimacy of  the judicial process, in place since the founding, animates and 
breathes life into subsidiary concepts, such as the presumption of  innocence and the right of  appeal, 
proving they are actual requirements in real cases rather than theoretical platitudes or aspirational 
goals.  And this is so in the aftermath of  9/11, too, with the Supreme Court exploring seriously the 
arguments and claims of  all the parties, including Muslims.  
Nations threatened, injured, and fearful may be tempted to depart from the norm, and may look 
to the unusual circumstances of  the particular threat to create a novel system of  law governed by 
modifi ed expectations of  what is just.  But in the post-9/11 context,  judicial review has remained a 
vital cog in the American wartime machine even when the other coordinate branches sought to di-
minish or circumscribe its constitutional role, for example with the DTA and MCA.  That individu-
als may invoke this system to air their grievances, compel the other side to answer for their conduct, 
and potentially vindicate their rights—even in a time of  national stress and hostilities like 9/11—is a 
testament to the vitality of  American law.232  
In short, while specifi c decisions may satisfy some and rub others the wrong way, the legal 
process in which the courts neutrally hear individual cases and dispense with them based on facts, 
evidence, and law is a source of  American soft power that deserves wider understanding on the 
global stage.  Muslims and others may be drawn closer to American interests with the knowledge, 
exemplifi ed by the robust judicial review occurring after 9/11, that this is a nation of  laws, not men.  
As Katyal concluded in his remarks after Hamdan:
[I]f  we’re going to win the war on terror, we are going to win it through our soft power, we’re 
going to win it through saying to the world that we actually have a better model than you because in 
your countries you settle these things through force and fi at, and here we settle them through law, we 
settle them through law.233
 
CONCLUSION
In this Article, I have argued that, to the extent that the American military campaigns tied to 
9/11 are not providing desired results and that winning the battle of  “hearts and minds” is a neces-
sary component for an American victory in those theatres, American law, particularly judicial review, 
232  The argument can be made that judicial review is not only important in wartime, see Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 
372 U.S. 144, 164–165 (1963) (“The imperative necessity for safeguarding these rights to procedural due process under 
the gravest of  emergencies has existed throughout our constitutional history, for it is then, under the pressing exigencies 
of  crisis, that there is the greatest temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees which, it is feared, 
will inhibit governmental action”); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 264 (1967) (“It would indeed be ironic if, in the 
name of  national defense, we would sanction the subversion of  one of  those liberties . . . which makes the defense of  
the Nation worthwhile”), but is even more critical role in times of  national emergency or crisis, such as war, see 9/11 
COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 1, at 394 (a “shift of  power and authority to the government [after 9/11] calls for an 
enhanced system of  checks and balances to protect the precious liberties that are vital to our way of  life.”) (emphasis 
added).
233  Katyal, Successes and Challenge in Terrorism, supra note 231.
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may resonate with moderates in the Muslim world.  I am optimistic in the potential for the American 
constitutional scheme, encompassing judicial review, to generate a more favorable impression of  the 
United States.
This confi dence is tempered by two, related issues.  First, the United States must have an acces-
sible and reliable mechanism by which to inform moderate Muslims of  the Constitution and its legal 
dimensions.234  The Internet, with its cost-effectiveness, increasing availability, expansiveness, and 
rampant use by the youth, may be an effective means by which to spread substantive information 
on the United States and her legal dimensions.235  It is unclear how the United States may impartially 
disseminate content in an online format that will reach, let alone appeal, to the moderate Muslim 
population.236  Suffi ce it to say for present purposes that the underlying subject matter—the Con-
stitution and its requisite legal elements—exist.  How to dress it up, for example by using games for 
students,237 is outside the realm of  this Article and is an issue best left addressed by more creative 
minds.   
This brings me to my second concern, which is that success of  a legal soft power resource is 
predicated to some degree on our own knowledge of  the Constitution and the law.  Data on the lack 
of  such knowledge is as striking as it is disturbing.  A report by the National Constitution Center, for 
example, found that more American teenagers “can name three of  the Three Stooges than can name 
the three branches of  government (59% to 41%), know the Fresh Prince of  Bel-Air than know the 
Chief  Justice of  the Supreme Court (94.7% to 2.2%), [and] know which city has the zip code ‘90210’ 
than the city in which the U.S. Constitution was written (75% to 25%)[.]”238  
Until broader understanding of  the Constitution and legal character of  the United States is 
234  See Kochan, supra note 29, at 558 (“Universal truths, individual rights, constitutional governance, the rule of  law, 
and free markets have evolved from written documents debating these principles under the U.S. legal system.  These 
principles have traction in international relations, but only if  they are exposed to the outside world for refl ection.”); id. at 
569 (“words ring hollow if  they are not read because they cannot be disseminated or are lost in translation.”).
235   As the Internet is a recruitment ground for Muslims, see Griff  Witte, Jerry Markon and Shaiq Hussain, Terrorist 
Recruiters Leverage the Web, WASH. POST, Dec. 13, 2009 (describing the extremists’ tactic of  trolling popular web sites, 
including social networking sites, to connect with prospective members), it may also serve as a place in which the United 
States can get to everyday Muslim youth and moderates.  But see Kochan, supra note 29, at 561 (advocating that books 
should be the way in which American foundational documents are shared, as “ [b]ook translations are cost effi cient and 
an empirically successful means of  cultural diplomacy.”).
236  What I mean by “impartially” is that the contents of  the information about the United States should be 
descriptive in nature rather than comparative.  Information conveyed with actual or perceived or condescension will 
repulse moderates and be counterproductive.  See Nye, SOFT POWER, at x supra note 31, at x (“attraction can turn into 
repulsion if  we act in an arrogant manner and destroy the real message of  our deeper values.”).
237  For example, Our Courts, “a web-based education project designed to teach students civics and inspire them to 
be active participants in our democracy,” headed by Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, attempts to instruct students about 
the law through ostensibly “fun” games. See About Our Courts, Our Courts, available at http://www.ourcourts.org/
about-our-courts (last visited Mar. 18 2010).
238  More Teens Can Name Three Stooges Than Can Name Three Branches of  Government, National Constitution 
Center, Sept. 2, 1998, available at  http://constitutioncenter.org/fi les/stooges/pdf  (last visited Mar. 18, 2010).
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achieved, a “learned” subset must be relied upon to release soft power premised on the law.239  For 
this soft power to be more credible and effective, however, it would behoove members of  this coun-
try to have a minimal appreciation for the constitutional nature of  the republic such that Americans 
can be substantive ambassadors of  and vehicles for this form of  soft power. 
These issues aside, I hope this Article has identifi ed to the American legal community a foreign 
policy resource that heretofore has been neglected and that may be useful in the beleaguered Ameri-
can efforts abroad.  America has drawn millions to its shores and led countless others to be enam-
ored by the opportunities and narratives that make up the “American dream.”  In a war which has 
been fought on military terms, it is incumbent on those interested in prevailing in these confl icts to 
safeguard America, perhaps by discussing America itself.240  
The courts, in performing their traditional checking function during the course of  these hostili-
ties, are honoring their place in the Framers’ concept of  an Empire of  Liberty.241  They are also, 
perhaps unwittingly, providing us with a substantive and meaningful instrument that may help quell 
those bent on destroying the United States and thereby orphaning the very ideas that defi ne us, make 
us different, and worthy of  enduring with mankind.242 
239  See generally THE FEDERALIST No. 35 (Alexander Hamilton) (envisioning an intellectual crème-of-the-crop which 
would guide the direction of  the nation above the people who would be understand and follow only their parochial 
interests).
240  See Abraham Lincoln, Address at Gettysburg, Pennsylvania (Nov. 19, 1863), in LINCOLN:  SPEECHES AND WRITINGS 
1859–1865 536 (Don E. Fehrenbacher ed., 1989) (noting that the “nation, conceived in Liberty, and dedicated to the 
proposition that all men are created equal,” is engaged in a war that “test[s] whether that nation, or any nation, so 
conceived and so dedicated, can long endure,” and that it is up to the living to ensure that “this nation . . . shall not 
perish from the earth.”).
241  See JOSEPH J. ELLIS, AMERICAN CREATION: TRIUMPHS AND TRAGEDIES IN THE FOUNDING OF THE REPUBLIC 230 
(Random House 2007) (identifying Thomas Jefferson as the Framer who coined this phrase to describe the character of  
the United States); see also id. at 228 (providing an example of  Jefferson’s use of  this phrase).
242  See THOMAS PAINE, COMMON SENSE 3 (Mark Philp ed., Oxford Univ. Press 1995) (1776) (“The c ause of 
 merica i s, in  a  great  measure, the cause of all mankind.”).A  
